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ROAD MAP TO REVOLUTION? PATENT-BASED 
OPEN SCIENCE 
Lee Petherbridge, Ph.D. 
The contemporary approach to innovation in the life sciences relies on a patent-
based proprietary model. Limitations on patent rights and business concerns often 
focus innovation to markets where the near-term monetary rewards are highest. This 
is "efficient" under an austere understanding of the term, but the proprietary model can 
be problematic from a practical perspective because it may not focus innovation to 
certain deserving markets. This Article contends that the property rights conferred by 
patent law may still serve as a positive base for innovation directed to underserved 
markets. The comparatively strong rights conferred by patent law provide upstream 
or pioneering innovators the power to establish some of the environmental conditions 
in which subsequent innovation takes place. This includes a power to create an 
environment of relatively open access to rights, which in appropriate cases may foster 
efficiency gains, reduce innovation suppressive costs, and achieve production for 
ultimate consumers at closer to marginal cost. In several parts, this paper discusses the 
topography oflaw and innovation in the life sciences, the characteristics of innovation 
in the life sciences that may support the use of patents to impose an "open science" 
framework, a legal means of imposing such a framework using servitudes, and some 
of the legal and economic implications of using patents in this manner. This Article 
concludes that there are reasons why universities and research-oriented medical 
schools should sometimes favor this approach and that limited testing should be 
performed to determine the efficacy of the approach. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The difficult economic conditions of the l 970s 1 gave rise to important changes in 
the innovation infrastructure of the life sciences. Where before patents were not sought 
as a matter of course for inventions made in publicly funded university and medical 
• Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. The Author wishes to thank the 
scholars and participants in the Closing in on Open Science Symposium at the University of Maine School 
of Law, and the scholars and participants at The Evolution of the Open Source Model: To Life Saving 
Drugs and Beyond symposium at Temple Law School, for their many helpful comments and suggestions. 
Thanks to (in no particular order) Brietta Clark, Yann Joly, David Opderbeck, Kristen Osenga, Lorelei 
Ritchie de Larena, Jason Rantanen, and R. Polk Wagner for helpful comments and suggestions on earlier 
drafts, and/or discussing the ideas within this article during the course of its writing. It goes (nearly) 
without saying that the fact that someone was kind enough to read and comment on a draft is not an 
endorsement ofits contents-all mistakes are my own. I would also like to specifically thank Krystle V aziri 
who provided excellent research assistance, and the editors of the Maine Law Review who labored to help 
make this final product. Comments are appreciated: lee.petherbridge@lls.edu. 
I. See, e.g., Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit in Perspective, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 821,822 (2005) 
( citing "economic recession, high unemployment, mass layoffs of scientists and engineers, and extreme 
inflation"). 
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school laboratories, 2 the policy choices given effect in the Bayh-Dole Act3 encouraged 
the patenting of university inventions.4 The increase in university patenting, in tum, 
altered the relationship between public science and private science. Where before the 
inventions, e.g., the discovery and/or creation of new and useful knowledge, 
information, and materials, of public science would, through publication, disclosure 
at meetings, and other informal networks, eventually surface as public goods unfettered 
with formal property rights, the policy choices given effect by the Bayh-Dole Act, 
while perhaps encouraging earlier disclosure, also encouraged the consistent 
attachment of formal property rights to the products of public science. 
The consequence is that in the contemporary approach to innovation, formal 
property rights, rather than being the feature which distinguishes public science from 
private science, becomes a tool oftheir integration. Concepts of property, particularly 
property as envisioned by the patent laws, now connect upstream public invention with 
downstream innovation, e.g., research and development directed to the creation and 
commercialization of products. Because of the cumulative nature ofinnovation in the 
life sciences, now more than ever, universities and firms are supposed to take into 
account property rights when they make decisions on what experiments to perform and 
how to spend precious research and development dollars. 
The goal of the policy of encouraging universities to patent their diverse range of 
inventive output is to encourage innovation. By mechanisms now familiar to even 
first-year law students, the legal rights conveyed in a patent, particularly the right to 
exclude, allow rights holders to appropriate some of the benefits of innovative work. 
The ability to appropriate benefits serves as an ex ante incentive to take on economic 
risk-the risk involved with the uncertainty-laden task of attempting to create new and 
useful products and processes. 
While this approach logically encourages investment in innovation, it has the 
drawback of concentrating capital for innovation directed to either the highest benefit 
expected innovations, or at a minimum, innovations where the benefits can be 
predicted to be greater than the cost of innovation. In particular, innovation may be 
directed away from: (I) diseases that are perceived as having low commercial value 
because they either affect large numbers of the economically disenfranchised 5 or 
2. See, e.g., Iain M. Cockburn, The Changing Structure of the Pharmaceutical Industry: Drug 
Development Under Today's New Institutional Arrangements Could Tum Out to Be Faster and Better, but 
Not Cheaper, 23 HEAL TH AFFAIRS I 0, 13-14 (2004) ( describing an "essentially binary" industry structure). 
3. Universities and Small Business Patent Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § b(a) 94 Stat. 3018 
(1980) [hereinafter Bayh-Dole Act] (codified as amended in scattered sections of35 U.S.C.). 
4. The purpose of the Bayh-Dole Act is "to promote the utilization ofinventions arising from federally 
supported research or development." 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000). 
5. By some estimates, "[d]eveloping countries account for four-fifths of the world's population, but 
less than ten percent of the global pharmaceutical market." Ellen F. M. Hoen, The Responsibility of 
Research Universities to Promote Access to Essential Medicines, 3 YALE J. OF HEAL TH POL 'y, L & ETHICS, 
293,295 (2003). See Stephen M. Maurer, et al., Finding Cures for Tropical Diseases: Is Open Source 
an Answer, PLOS 1(3): e56 (2004) (discussing neglected diseases such as leishmania, sleeping sickness, 
chagas, and malaria); Patrice Troullier & Piero Olliaro, Drug Development Output from 1975 to 1996: 
What Proportion for Tropical Diseases, 3(2) INT'LJ. OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES 61 ( 1998-99) (reporting that 
only about one-percent of chemical entities commercialized were directed to these and other important 
tropical diseases including filariasis, helminthic infections, trypanosymiasis, leishmaniasis, malaria, and 
shistosomiasis; also reporting that only a fraction of those drugs were other than incidental discoveries). 
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because they affect small numbers ofindividuals 6 (almost) regardless of their economic 
status; or (2) projects involving highly complex scientific research of the sort that 
requires such a large number of participants that it may not be efficiently performed 
by a single lab, 7 or even by a single commercial entity. 
More primary information revealing the broad impact of these diseases can be found at the World Health 
Organization website. One example includes 
Lymphatic Filariasis, known as Elephantiasis, [which] puts at risk more than a billion 
people .... Over 120 million have already been affected by it, [and] over 40 million of 
them are seriously incapacitated and disfigured by the disease. One-third of the people 
infected ,vith the disease live in L,din, one third are in ~~T.ca[,] and most of the remainder 
are in South Asia, the Pacific[,] and the Americas ... 
Lymphatic filiariasis causes a heavy social burden because it is "primarily a disease of the poor ... [and] 
... has steadily increased because of the expansion of slum areas and poverty, especially in Africa and the 
Indian sub-continent. As many filariasis patients are physically incapacitated, it is also a disease that 
prevents patients from having a normal working life." WORLD HEAL TH 0RGANIZA TION, FACT SHEET NO. 
I 02: LYMPHATIC FILARIASIS (2000), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/fact-sheets/fs I 02/en/. 
Another example is "[m]alaria[, which] is an infection caused by a parasite and carried from person 
to person by mosquitoes. It is preventable and curable but kills more than one million people-most of 
them young children living in Africa-each year." World Health Organization, Global Malaria Programme, 
http://malaria.who.int/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2007). 
Annual economic growth in countries with high malaria transmission has historically been 
lower than in countries without malaria. Economists believe that malaria is responsible for 
a 'growth penalty' ofup to 1.3% per year in some African countries. When compounded 
over the years, this penalty leads to substantial differences in GDP between countries with 
and without malaria and severely restrains the economic growth of the entire region. 
Roll Back Malaria, http://www.rbm.who.int/cmc_upload/O/OOO /015/363/RBM!nfosheet_lO.htm (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2007). 
Regarding Dengue Fever: "Some 2500 million people--two fifths of the world's population-are now 
at risk from dengue. WHO currently estimates there may be 50 million cases of dengue infection worldwide 
every year." There are over five hundred thousand hospitalizations each year and up to a 20 percent 
mortality rate when an infection is not property treated. WORLD HEAL TH 0RGANIZA TION FACT SHEET NO. 
117: DENGUE AND DENGUE HAEMORRHAGIC FEVER (2002), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/ 
factsheets/fs 117 /en/. 
It is worth noting that while the fatalities associated with these and other neglected diseases are 
clearly significant, the social impact of these diseases goes well beyond causing deaths. Those who do not 
die may be chronically affected. Thus, in many of these cases it may be myopic to think of innovation 
directed to these diseases as having low commercial value. It is perhaps another imperfection of a property-
based system that it is structurally unable to appropriate the social benefits lost to these diseases. 
6. The list of these diseases would be, perhaps, impossibly long. A few examples of diseases with low 
commercial value include Epidermolytic Hyperkeratosis, which is characterized by blistering and scaling 
of the skin that looks similar in appearance to corrugated cardboard and is caused by mutations in 
epidermal keratins. See J.A. Rothnagel et al., Mutations in the Rod Domains of Keratins 1 and JO in 
Epidermolytic Hyperkeratosis, 257 SCIENCE 1128, 1128 (1992). Epidermolysis Bullosa Simplex causes 
a severe form of blistering due to basal keratinocyte cytolysis in about I in every 50,000 people. See Pierre 
A. Coulombe et al., Point Mutations in Human Keratin 14 Genes of Epidermolysis Bullosa Simplex 
Patients: Genetic and Functional Analyses, 66 CELL 1301, 1301 (1991). Another example is Rett 
syndrome, which 
is a genetic disorder that strikes roughly one in I 0,000 girls just as they are beginning to 
walk and talk. After developing normally for about a year, girls with the syndrome regress, 
losing any words they've learned as well as the ability to make purposeful movements. They 
end up with severe mental and physical disabilities and require full-time care. 
See Greg Miller, Getting a Read on Rett Syndrome, 314 SCIENCE 1536, 1536 (2006). 
7. See, e.g., R. Taussig et al., Overview of the Alliance for Cell Signaling, 420 NATURE 703, 703 
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In several parts, this Article explains that the prudent use of a patent-based open 
science approach may provide an appropriate complement to current paradigms of 
innovation in the life sciences. Part II begins by setting forth a topography of 
innovation in the life sciences. As is nearly universally acknowledged, that topography 
reveals universities and medical schools performing broad-based scientific research 
funded in significant part by public monies. This section also notes how the outputs 
of this "public" science, often too undeveloped for broad commercial application, 
frequently serve as substrates, or inputs, for subsequent "private" scientific research 
performed by for-profit firms. This leveraging of public science in service ofnational 
economic policy is, Part II explains, imposed in part through propertization of the 
outputs of public science. As this part of the Article further explains, propertization 
is importantly imposed through the patent laws, creating a rights environment with 
several significant features and implications. One implication is the necessary 
production of what this Article terms "innovation suppressive costs," which can affect 
the path and progress of innovation. Thus, Part II sketches a picture of an innovation 
framework that is both sequential and cumulative in quality, one involving different 
actors with different motivations, but who share a nexus in property rights. A 
framework in which downstream "private" science actors depend on the information, 
materials, and rights created by upstream "public" science actors. 
Part III acknowledges the perceived significance of property rights to innovation, 
and from that perspective observes that efforts to develop innovation frameworks that 
may better serve certain markets should be complementary to patent-based approaches. 
From this view, it is suggested that the focus should be on refining the deployment of 
property rights to encourage innovation ends rather than attenuating or disrupting what 
is widely accepted to be a general usefulness of property rights in promoting 
investment in, and the production of, innovation. In seeking a framework for 
refinement, this part focuses on mechanisms that might reduce innovation suppressive 
costs and, additionally, provide positive efficiency gains by encouraging the 
participation of peer innovators. This part discusses features of innovation in the life 
sciences that suggest that an open science approach ( one crafted to provide relatively 
liberal access to rights) may sometimes be not only appropriate, but also desirable. It 
finds helpful analogies by comparing innovation in the life sciences to aspects of the 
open source software framework and recent works generalizing principles important 
for peer production. This part concludes that some life science research and 
development is amenable to an open science approach. 
The theoretical and factual points developed in Parts II and III are brought 
together and applied in Part IV in search ofa legal means of imposing a patent-based 
open science framework. After considering other possible approaches to directing 
innovation to underserved markets, this part proposes the use of a servitude on a 
patent. As discussed, this approach can fit comfortably within the current proprietary 
framework, can be deployed in forms that do not pose the threat of serious harm to the 
(2002) [hereinafter Alliance for Cell Signaling] (describing a project to comprehensively examine cell 
signaling pathways); Arti K. Rai, Open and Collaborative Research: A New Mode/for Biomedicine, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FRONTIER INDUSTRIES 131-58 (Robert W. Hahn ed., AEI Brookings 
Press 2005) (analyzing the approach taken by Alliance for Cell Signaling). 
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ubiquitous rights-based innovative framework, and is especially useful when a potential 
commercial product is perceived to be far off or of uncertain commercial value. Thus, 
this part sets forth and discusses a framework for the measured application of patent 
servitudes in life sciences research. 
Part V offers some concluding remarks and points to a number of reasons why it 
may sometimes be in the best interest of universities and research-oriented medical 
schools to use the approach described in Part IV. It also proposes that the approach 
be tested experimentally, so information can be gathered on potential drawbacks, the 
interest in working subject matter with the "open" restriction, and metrics that may 
reveal the practical desirability vel non of the approach. Data should be collected and 
reported upon periodically. 
II. A TOPOGRAPHY OF INNOVATION AND LAW IN THE LIFE SCIENCES 
A. The Industrial Infrastructure: Integrating Public and Private Science 
For most of the twentieth century innovation in the life sciences has been 
dominated by the firms of the pharmaceutical industry. Until the lastthirty years or so, 
a typical firm was both large and fully integrated in terms of its capacity to process 
innovation from drug discovery, to clinical trials, to regulatory approval for marketing, 
to manufacturing and quality control. 8 These firms relied heavily on patents and other 
forms ofintellectual property to appropriate returns from innovation (i.e., downstream 
research and development). 9 
During the same period, publicly funded science performed in laboratories at 
universities and medical schools was rarely patented. 10 Instead the new and useful 
knowledge, information, and materials created by public science made its way into the 
public domain as it gradually surfaced at study sections, at scientific conferences, in 
publications, or through a variety of informal networks of scientific communication. 
Thus, pharmaceutical firms typically accessed publicly funded upstream inventions at 
low cost. Moreover, upon being sufficiently distributed the inventions generated by 
public science generally took on the trappings of public goods, serving as tools and 
resources to scientists in both private and public science in a nonrivalrous manner. 
In the 1970s, economic conditions caused the United States to take stock of its 
economic strengths and weaknesses. 11 According to Circuit Judge Pauline Newman 
it was "recognized then . . . that our economic strength as a nation depends on 
technological leadership, the balance of trade, and a culture that favors creativity, 
entrepreneurship, and industrial activity. " 12 This period ofintrospection also produced 
the understanding that some of the identified aspects of national economic strength 
8. See Cockburn, supra note 2, at 13. 
9. See id. 
10. See id. at 14; see also Association of University Technology Managers, AUTM U.S. Licensing 
Survey: FY 2004 available at http://www.autm.net/events/File/04AUTMSurveySum-USpublic.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2007) [hereinafter AUTM Survey] (reporting that universities were issued fewer than 250 
patents in 1980). 
11. Newman, supra note I, at 822 (citing "economic recession, high unemployment, mass layoffs of 
scientists and engineers, and extreme inflation"). 
12. Id. at 821. 
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could be encouraged or discouraged by governmental policy. 13 One aspect of 
government policy implicated by the studies and testimony of the time was the law and 
policy of patents. What was concluded was that the patent system had become so 
weakened over the preceding years that it had lost its ability to support investment in 
the creation and commercialization of new and improved products. 14 
What followed in the 1980s was a wave oflegislative action intended to encourage 
innovation and rescue the country from recession. Perhaps the most notable pieces of 
legislation were targeted to the patent system: the Bayh-Dole Act 15 and the Federal 
Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 16 which created the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit. The purpose of the Bayh-Dole Act is "to promote the 
utilization of the inventions arising from federally supported research or 
development." 17 Its policy goal is largely achieved by clarifying the rules concerning 
the ownership of patents on inventions created using federally funded research. The 
purposes of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 are several, but one 
important purpose is to unify appellate jurisdiction to promote clarity, predictability, 
and certainty in the patent law. 18 
These policy choices took place in a background environment of very broadly 
written patent statutes 19 and case law that already permitted making property of a wide 
range oflife science outputs.20 Adding to the mix was the advent in (mostly) university 
laboratories of immunological, cellular, and molecular technologies, which made 
useable a new array of materials and methods important in the prosecution of 
innovation in the life sciences. The market consequences of this combination of 
political, legal, and technological change were that university patenting behavior 
increased by a fold. In 1980, the year the Bayh-Dole Act was passed, universities were 
issued fewer than 250 patents. In 2004, they received 3,680 patents and filed over 
10,500 patent applications. 21 
The consequence to public science of these technological and legal changes has 
been substantial. Encouraging universities to engage in the formal propertization of 
publicly funded discovery, invention, and in some cases, innovation has significantly 
increased the influence of public science on private science as well as the reverse. 
Universities are now active participants in the patent system. 22 Although they are less 
13. Id. at 822. 
14. Id. 
15. Bayh-Dole Act, supra note 3. 
16. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended in scattered sections of28 U.S.C.). 
17. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000). 
18. The Federal Circuit was created for a number of other reasons, as its broad subject matter 
jurisdiction attests. See, e.g., Newman, supra note I, at 823-24 (describing the various jurisdictions). 
However, one important reason for the creation of the Federal Circuit was to unify patent jurisprudence and 
bring clarity and certainty to the law. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case 
Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. I, 2 (I 989). 
19. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1980) (describing the broad intent of 
Congress in enacting 35 U.S.C. § IOI). 
20. See, e.g., Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 102-14 (S.D.N.Y. 191 !), a.ff din 
part, I 96 F. 496, 498 (2d Cir. 1912) (finding patentable a natural biochemical substance purified away 
from its natural environs). 
21. AUTM Survey, supra note I 0. 
22. Id. 
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likely than commercial entities to patent therapeutic end products, universities often 
obtain patent rights to "upstream" inventions that in terms of innovation serve 
primarily as substrates for future research and development. Upstream inventions may 
include tools and reagents necessary for future research 23 such as nucleic acid 
sequences 24 and proteomic targets, 25 which may serve as potential targets for chemical 
or small-molecule therapeutics. Other upstream inventions patented by universities 
may include new techniques 26 and important materials derived from the application of 
new techniques, 27 both of which may serve as important platforms for subsequent 
advances across a large number oflife science disciplines. 28 
In many cases involving patents directed to "upstream" inventions, universities 
license the patents to smaller biotechnology firms or startups. Relying on the licensed 
patents, these smaller firms seek to attract funding sufficient to perform additional 
research and development. The goals of smaller firms can be varied, but common 
goals include advancing the state of development by, e.g., perfecting a technique, 
applying a technique to acquire a new or important substrate or target, or manipulating 
and testing genomic or proteomic inventions in animal models to establish a key 
understanding or proof of principle. These incremental advances can then be used to 
garner more financial support or can be sold or licensed to larger biotechnology or 
pharmaceutical firms. 
Broadly speaking, it is larger biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms that perform 
the tasks associated with later-stage innovation in the life sciences. This generally 
includes advancing promising technologies to the point where products can be 
profitably produced and marketed to consumers. Because these larger firms often sell 
the commercial embodiments of research outputs to consumers, they typically have 
positive revenue streams and have proven consistently capable of concentrating capital 
through both revenues and access to financial markets. As licensing partners of 
universities or smaller firms, or both, these larger firms have the expertise to identify 
23. See, e.g., Method for the Detection of NF-kappa B Regulatory Factors, U.S. Patent No. 6,232,081 
(filed Oct. 15, I 998). 
24. See, e.g., Keratin Kl Expression Vectors and Methods of Use, U.S. Patent No. 5,914,265 (filed 
Nov. I, 1993); Human C/EBP Gene and Vectors for its Expression, U.S. Patent No. 5,545,563 (filed Mar. 
4, 1994). 
25. See, e.g., Nucleic Acid and Amino Acid Sequences for Mammalian Sulfonylurea Receptor, U.S. 
Patent No. 6,054,313 (filed June 7, 1995). 
26. See, e.g., Stanley Fields & Ok-kyn Song, A Novel Genetic System to Detect Protein-Protein 
Interactions, 340 NATURE 245, 245-46 (1989) (reporting the yeast two hybrid system); System to Detect 
Protein-Protein Interactions, U.S. Patent No. 5,283,173 (filed Jan. 24, 1990); see also Mutated Steroid 
Hormone Receptors, Methods for Their Use and Molecular Switch for Gene Therapy, U.S. Patent No. 
5,935,934 (filed May 30, 1995); Methods for the Genetic Modification of Endogenous Genes in Animal 
Cells by Homologous Recombination, U.S. Patent No. 5,614,396 (filed Feb. 22, 1994); Transgenic Mice 
Containing a Disrupted p53 Gene, U.S. Patent No. 5,569,824 (filed July 21, 1994); Transgenic Non-Human 
Mammals, U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (filed June 22, 1984). 
27. See, e.g., Sulfonylurea ReceptorTrangenic Rodents, U.S. Patent No. 6,03 I, I 50 (filed June 7, 1995); 
Non-Human Animal Having Predefined Allele ofa Cellular Adhesion Gene, U.S. Patent No. 5,602,307 
(filed Sept. 20, 1994); see also, e.g., '313 Patent (Claims 5, 8, & 9 pertaining to cell lines); Permanent 
Human Hepatocyte Cell Line and its Use in a Liver Assist Device (LAD), U.S. Patent No. 5,290,684 (filed 
Oct. 23, 1992) (also pertaining to cell lines). 
28. See '173 Patent; '934 Patent; '396 Patent. 
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and select upstream work that seems most promising from both a technical and 
profitability standpoint. With some of the risk concentrated on universities and smaller 
firms, these larger firms can focus on other cost-intensive aspects of innovation in the 
life sciences such as later-stage drug development with its attendant animal and clinical 
trials, registration and marketing approvals, manufacture, quality control, and 
marketing and sales. 
As described in more detail below, principles of property, and particularly of 
patent rights, play a central role in the relationship between these market actors and 
therefore in the path and progress of innovation in the life sciences. Universities and 
research-oriented medical schools create and collect important property rights but are 
generally not structured to engage in later-stage innovation. Subsequent innovation 
performed by start-ups and smaller biotechnology companies often rely on property 
rights established first by universities and research-oriented medical schools. Further 
innovation creates additional property rights, which, like other upstream rights, must 
be identified and bundled for use by later innovators or by firms that market products 
to consumers. Thus, the path and progress of innovation in the life sciences is closely 
tied to the existence of property rights, the number and variety of those rights, and the 
relationships and business acumen of rights holders. 
B. The Legal Infrastructure: A Proprietary Approach 
While traditional notions of property rights as applied to chattels 29 apply to goods 
and services produced by the life sciences industry, the intangible quality ofintellectual 
goods combined with a low cost of imitation may seriously degrade or even largely 
destroy the ability of innovators to appropriate benefits from very cost-heavy 
innovations. This innovation suppressive effect is compensated for by complementing 
basic common law property principles with statutory patent law. 30 This creates 
29. See, e.g., Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929). 
30. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2000). The copyright laws, codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-1,332 (2000), are 
another example ofa statutory complement to common law property principles in pursuit of the production 
of intangible goods. One thing that separates the rights conferred by the patent laws from the rights 
conferred by the copyright laws is the breadth and depth of protection. Copyright law protects original 
works ofauthorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression. 17 U.S.C. § I 02 (2000); see Feist Publ'ns, 
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,345 (1991). But while copyright law creates a lengthy term and 
imposes liability for derivative works, copyright law affords a scope of propertization that is thin in 
comparison to patent law. Copyright protection does not extend to facts, see Feist, 499 U.S. at 345, nor 
to "any idea," see Baker v. Selden, IOI U.S. 99, 102 (1879), "procedure, process, system, method of 
operation, concept, principle, or discovery," 17 U.S.C. § I 02(b) (2000). Patent law stands in sharp relief 
because it allows for the protection of the innovation of nearly all of these things to some extent depending 
on the degree to which an applicant can capture them by strategic claiming. 35 U.S.C. § IOI (2000) 
("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions 
and requirements of this title."). The exceptions in the patent laws are reflected in the general 
unpatentability of laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas. See, e.g., Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 44 7 U.S. 303, 309- 10 ( I 980) ( collecting cases prohibiting such patents but finding patentable 
claims to genetically modified living organisms); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981) 
(finding patentable subject matter involving an algorithm); Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 
F. 95, 102-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff'd in part, 196 F. 496,498 (2d Cir. 1912)(finding patentable a natural 
biochemical substance purified from its natural environs). 
HeinOnline -- 59 Me. L. Rev. 348 2007
348 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:2 
property rights in intangible goods,3 1 thereby enhancing the ability of the owner to 
appropriate the benefits of innovative work. 32 Consequently, the formal proprietary 
tool most often used in connection with life sciences research is patent law.33 
The putative benefit of this legal infrastructure is the well-worn concept of the 
patent bargain. Its deep normative basis is evident in the U.S. Constitution, which 
authorizes Congress to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective . . . 
Discoveries." 34 In the bargain, the public grants property rights and accepts the 
potential of supramarginal cost pricing in exchange for the disclosure of new and 
useful information and an increase in quality of life derived from innovation-the 
development and production of new or improved processes, machines, manufactures, 
and compositions of matter. 
In the United States, patents are generally available for "anything under the sun 
that is made by man" 35 and that is new, 36 useful, 37 and nonobvious. 38 Indeed, most of 
the industrialized and developing world has either implemented or agreed to implement 
standards that are roughly the same. 39 Patents are available on a wide range of life 
science inputs and outputs. A limited list might include patents directed to nucleic acid 
sequences that comprise genes,40 complementary DNA,41 and/or polypeptides. 42 
31. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000) (stating that "patents shall have the attributes of personal property"). 
32. Id. at§ 271 (2000) (defining an infringer as someone who "without authority makes, uses, offers 
to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States, or imports into the United States any 
patented invention"). 
33. See, e.g., Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173, 175 
( 1986) (reporting that patents are very important in the development of pharmaceuticals). 
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
35. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309. 
36. 35 u.s.c. § 102 (2000). 
37. Id. at§ 101. 
38. Id. at§ 103(a), (b)(l). 
39. The Agreement requiring harmonization referred to here is the "TRIPS Agreement." Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter 
TRIPS Agreement). The express standards contained in the TRIPS Agreement are "new, involve an 
inventive step and are capable of industrial application." Id. at Art. 27, para. 1. The TRIPS Agreement 
further explains that "[f]or the purposes of this Article, the terms 'inventive step' and 'capable ofindustrial 
application' may be deemed by a Member to be synonymous with the terms 'non-obvious' and 'useful' 
respectively." Id. at n.5. 
40. See, e.g., Clontech Labs, Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing a 
claim ofU.S. Patent No. 5,405,776 directed to a polynucleotide); Cyclin E Genes and Proteins, U.S. Patent 
No. 5,973,119 (filed June 5, 1998); see also, supra note 24 (U.S. Patents Nos. 5,914,265 and 5,545,563). 
41. See, e.g., CDNA Collections Encoding Proteins Regulated During Programmed Cell Death, and 
Method ofUse Thereof, U.S. Patent No. 5,928,871 (filed Sept. 8, 1997). 
42. See, e.g., Clontech Labs, Inc., 406 F.3d at 1350 (citing a claim of U.S. Patent No. 5,244,797 
directed to a polypeptide). 
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Patents are also available for cell lines,43 screening methods, 44 expression systems,45 
transgenic animals,46 and a host of other research outputs, tools, and methods. 
In law, patent rights are protected by the right to exclude, 47 a property rule.48 
Theoretically, any stranger to the right who desires to make, use, or sell embodiments 
of patented subject matter must negotiate permission from the right holder. 49 This 
principle gives rise to two features of the patent law important when considering 
sequential or other cumulative innovation. First, an infringer of patent rights ( e.g., 
someone who without authority uses the claimed subject matter) who knows nothing 
of a patent will still be found to infringe that patent and under general principles of 
equity subject to an injunction. 50 Second, the principle extends to situations where a 
patentee seeks to practice an invention claimed in the patentee's own patent(s). The 
consequence is that the owner of a patent and its attendant rights does not possess the 
affirmative legal right to practice the subject matter claimed in a patent. Thus, a patent 
43. See, e.g., supra note 27. 
44. See, e.g., supra note 26. 
45. See, e.g., Expression Vector Systems and Method of Use, U.S. Patent No. 5,925,564 (filed June 
7, 1995); Growth Hormone Releasing Hormone Expression System and Methods of Use, Including Use in 
Animals, U.S. Patent No. 6,423,693 (filed July 24, 1998). 
46. See, e.g., supra note 26. 
47. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(l) (2000) (stating that a patent shall contain a grant of"the right to exclude 
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling ... or importing .... "). See also id. at§§ 271,283 
(establishing infringement and authorizing injunctions for "violation of any right secured by patent"); 
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 39, at Art. 28 (a patent "confer[s] on its owner ... exclusive rights"). 
48. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: 
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (describing property rules and liability rules). 
The normal remedy for patent infringement includes the equitable remedy of injunction to prevent the 
continued violation of rights secured by a patent. Compare Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F .2d 
1226, 1246-47 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (noting the general rule that a permanent injunction will issue once 
infringement and validity have been determined)with eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 
(2006) (suggesting the differing views of the Justices as to the validity of the use ofa property rule in most 
patent cases) and Richard A. Epstein et al., Brief of Various Law & Economics Professors et al. as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Respondent, eBay, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 183 7 (2006) ( arguing for maintaining a property 
rule). Despite a strong preference for a property rule in the case of patents, equity has always recognized 
limitations. Thus, a court may decline to enter an injunction after determining infringement and validity 
when the patentee's failure to practice an invention frustrates an important public need. See Rite-Hite Corp. 
v. Kelly Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. I 995). That is not to say that there are not jurisdictions where 
patents are occasionally treated as though they were protected by a liability rule. For instance, the TRIPS 
Agreement permits compulsory licensing under certain circumstances. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 
39, at Art. 27 para. 3. Even in the United States, a compulsory license is possible. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 
(2000). However, such a license seems rarely to have been taken. 
49. Because notice problems and strategic behavior make for an imperfect reality, patent rights are 
additionally protected by a liability rule. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) (authorizing damages "adequate to 
compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty" for periods where an 
infringer is without knowledge of the patentee's rights). Liability is also the remedy where an infringer 
knowingly disregards a patentee's rights. In such situations, however, liability is enhanced. See generally 
id. at§ 284 (stating that "the court may increase the damages up to three times"). 
50. Id. at§ 283; see, e.g., eBay, Inc., 126 S. Ct. at 1841 ("injunctive reliefrests within the equitable 
discretion of the ... court, and ... such discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional principles 
of equity .... "). 
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owner using the subject matter claimed in her own patent can still be adjudged an 
infringer,51 subject to damages and equitable relief, where the practice of her own 
patent infringes overlapping rights granted to a competitor by a different patent. 
The first feature follows from a straightforward application of the right to exclude. 
While the first is not generally known by a special title, the application of the property 
rule acts to "block" the use of claimed subject matter without permission. This allows 
the patentee to "holdout." As a general matter, this is the contemplated mechanism of 
the patent system. 52 In the context of sequential innovation the block may be of special 
impact where by its nature sequential innovation presents one or very few paths 
forward. 
In the parlance of the patent law, the second feature refers to the patent Jaw 
phenomenon of "blocking patents." 53 The earlier patentee may be "blocked" from 
practicing his invention by another patent directed to an improvement unless 
permission can be obtained from the downstream innovator. Naturally, the law of 
property and contracts make such permissions possible. However, as later discussed, 54 
as more rights need to be collected, the more likely it becomes that inefficient friction 
may develop in the transfer of rights. 
It is not too facile to suspect that the blocking nature of the rights conferred by 
patent laws has an impact on the path and progress of sequential or cumulative 
innovation. On the one hand, it is the blocking feature of the patent laws that is 
thought to encourage the production of intangible property. On the other hand, the 
blocking feature of the patent Jaws may allow a patentee to establish a monopoly and 
may increase the costs of transaction where numerous rights must be bundled to 
practice an invention or engage in subsequent innovation. These latter two situations 
give rise to two types of what shall be referred to as "innovation suppressive costs." 55 
51. See Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (citing Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Spectramed, Inc., 49 F.3d 1575, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995)) ("[T]here 
is no practicing the prior art defense to literal infringement."). 
52. See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persis/ant Errors in the Economic Analysis of 
Intellectual Property, 53 V AND. L. REV. 1727 (2000). 
53. This effect is caused by the nuances of patent law that permit new patents to fall within the scope 
of old patents and old patents to fall within the scope of new patents. A stereotypical example includes the 
situation where an inventor discovers a new use for known ( or no longer patentable) materials. See Rohm 
& Haas Inc., v. Roberts Chem. Co., 245 F.2d 693, 699 (4th Cir. 1957) (describing the statutory change 
creating patentability in this circumstance); 35 U.S.C. § I 00(b) (2000) (the term "process" includes "a new 
use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material"). Another related 
example is where one inventor obtains a patent directed to a category, or genus, of substances and a later 
inventor patents the discovery that certain members of the category, or species, are especially useful for the 
same purposes as the general category of substances, or for different purposes altogether. See Coming 
Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec., 868 F.2d 1251, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 1989). There are policy justifications for 
granting later patents in these types of circumstances. For additional discussion of blocking patents and 
their impact on innovation, see Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property 
Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997) and Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining 
Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75 (1994). 
54. See discussion infra Part 11.B.2. 
55. The term "innovation suppressive costs" is meant to describe the independent effect of the costs. 
It is not used to claim that a particular innovation has been thwarted either because of monopoly or because 
of high transaction costs. All the term acknowledges is that when one elects a property-based approach, 
one gets the good with the less good. What ultimately matters is the utility of the approach. As long as on 
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1. The Innovation Suppressive Cost of Monopoly 
The consequences of a monopoly in innovation generally are much debated. 56 
Under one view, largely attributed to Joseph A. Schumpeter, 57 larger firms are 
expected to be more innovative than smaller firms. The nature of capitalism, 
characterized by its inherent feature of "Creative Destruction," 58 drives a form of 
competition directed not to incremental increases in marginal profits, but directed 
instead to changes that provide more radical selective advantage. 59 The threat of 
selective disadvantage (i.e., being left behind) is "ever-present" 60 and because of the 
catastrophic consequences that follow from a failure to evolve, a monopolist can never 
sit on his hands; he must run, i.e., innovate, as fast as he can to stay just where he is. 
According to this view, an environment that includes monopolies or oligopolies 
may not only foster innovation, but may be particularly important to achieving 
innovation. 61 Because of supramarginal cost profits, it is these entities that have the 
ability to hedge the risks associated with innovation. 62 Moreover, the profits and 
market position enjoyed by the monopolist or oligopolist make it likely that such firms 
will be able to more fully appropriate the benefits of their innovations, which in tum 
supports subsequent innovation. 63 Firms unable to maintain supramarginal cost pricing 
can be expected to have a more difficult time concentrating the capital necessary for 
innovation and have a greater likelihood of expiring when costly innovation does not 
produce profitable products. 
balance a property-based approach results in greater social value than another approach, e.g., a commons-
based approach, then it is superior (as long as utility remains the measure, that is). The innovation 
suppressive effects of the use of property rights are internal to the calculation of the overall value of a 
property-based approach. By this definition, there are other innovation suppressive effects of the patent 
laws, e.g., the fact that patent laws make patented innovations developed earlier in time constantly 
vulnerable to appropriation by later comers who develop new and useful improvements. Acknowledging 
the existence ofinnovation suppressive costs is useful, particularly where the costs can be segregated in vivo 
from the benefits to innovation conferred by property rights. If innovation suppressive costs can be limited 
in a particular situation without interfering too much with the incentives to innovate, a net social benefit 
may be achieved. 
56. See, Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The Role 
of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813, 823-44 (2001) [hereinafter Fostering Cumulative 
Innovation] ( discussing the merits of concentration and competition). 
57. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 81-106 {1942). 
58. Id. at 83. 
59. Id. at 84-85 (stating, inter a/ia, that the competition that counts is that directed to "the new 
commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization"). 
60. Id. at 85. 
61. Id. at 87-106. 
62. Some additional risk-reducing strategies available to large dominant firms are summarized at: 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent 
Law Policy ch. 2, p. 12-13 (2003) [hereinafter To Promote Innovation], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/l 0/innovationrpt.pdf, including spreading the cost ofR&D across a wide range 
of output, maintaining multiple research and development projects, accessing financial markets, and more 
efficient internalization of the benefits of innovation. 
63. Id. at ch. 2, p. 13. 
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The legal rights attending a patent can sometimes confer a monopoly on the 
holder, 64 and may thus provide the patent owner market power useful to hedge the risks 
associated with innovation. But even where the property rights conferred by a patent 
do not create a monopoly, they may be capable of serving a similar centralizing 
purpose. 65 Under this view, patents directed to substrates for future research and 
development serve as "prospects." 66 Broader rights, the thinking goes, increase the 
efficiency with which investment in innovation can be managed. As long as 
information about patent rights is both available and reasonably clear,67 it is unlikely 
that a competitor will make a significant investment in commercializing a patent owned 
by another unless an agreement on appropriation can be reached. Structurally, this 
permits the property rights holder to coordinate innovation concerning the property. 
Having more concentrated the costs and benefits ofinnovation on the rights holder, he 
or she should be highly motivated to organize subsequent innovation in order to avoid 
wasting resources. 68 Moreover, because broader rights can be expected to increase 
appropriability, a patent owner has the possibility of greater return, which justifies 
greater investment in the commercialization of the patented subject matter.69 
Thus, from at least a theoretical perspective, granting broad upstream patent rights 
may be an efficient approach to innovation because centralization may have a cost-
reducing effect. This allows for at least some innovation that might not happen in a 
higher cost environment. In addition, cost-reducing centralization may increase the 
rate of innovation. Lower cost advances consume fewer resources and capital 
available for innovation, permitting their redeployment to other projects capable of 
generating new innovation. Alternatively, an increase in the rate of innovation could 
occur because the upstream rights holder focuses subsequent innovative work on, and 
applies the resources and capital saved by centralization to, the subject matter most 
critical to achieving a subsequent innovation. Put most plainly, prospect theory holds 
that as compared to a decentralized system that allows for a more free competition in 
the use of closely related rights-and thus, perhaps a greater likelihood of duplicative 
work---centralization should result in more innovation per innovation dollar expended. 
Such a laudatory view of the merits of either monopoly, oligopoly, or other form 
of centralization is not universal. Notwithstanding the possible waste associated with 
64. It is not necessary that a patent confer a monopoly, and the majority of patents are unlikely to do 
so. See Kitch, supra note 52, at 1729-34 ( explaining that a general conflation of intellectual property rights 
with the concept of monopoly is improper because it erroneously divorces the economic significance of 
property rights from an analysis of whether property rights confer a monopoly). However, as later 
discussed, due to the nature of innovation in the life sciences, patent rights may permit the rights holder to 
be the sole seller of a particular kind or class of product or service. For these goods, effective non-
infringing substitutes may be rare. Thus, monopoly or near-monopoly conditions may sometimes exist. 
65. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 275-
80 (1977). 
66. Id. 
67. This proposition provides a contrast to trade secrecy. Id. at 275, 277-78. Although few would 
argue with this contention, removed from comparison to trade secrecy, however, the notion that patent 
rights are well noticed may be optimistic. See Lee Petherbridge, Positive Examination, 46 IDEA 173, 191-
212 (2006) ( arguing that meaningful patent system reform should focus heavily on improving the notice 
function of patents). 
68. Kitch, supra note 65, at 276. 
69. Id. at 277-78. 
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duplicating work, scholars Robert Merges and Richard Nelson contend that 
competition may be a more efficient way to get improvement. 7° First, and perhaps 
foremost according to this view, the monopolist is encouraged only by the "carrot." 71 
Rivalrous competition adds the "stick" to the formula; a penalty for inaction.72 In 
addition, there is reason to question the attraction of the carrot. In situations where the 
products of innovation would cannibalize a monopolist's existing sales and where 
those sales would be unaffected in the absence of the monopolist's innovations, the 
monopolist may not be well-motivated to take on the expenditures ofinnovation. 73 
In addition, the benefits of centralization flow in significant degree from the fact 
that broad upstream rights holders have some reliable conception of which subsequent 
innovations are valuable, and perhaps even a conception of the embodiments of the 
subsequent innovations. Endowing rights holders with the omniscience to know both 
which improvements are valuable and how to most efficiently organize research and 
development to achieve such improvements may be overly optimistic. 74 If the 
upstream rights holder erroneously organizes around an approach that cannot work or 
is otherwise intractable because, e.g., it relies on erroneous information or a limited 
complementary technology, innovation can be delayed or halted. In such 
circumstances, innovation could become very expensive. 
The duplicative work associated with races to innovate may not be as wasteful as 
it at first might appear. Competition generates better consumer products at lower 
prices. 75 Moreover, competitors with diverse goals and purposes may be important for 
making valuable improvements to a broad upstream innovation. Because competitors 
will often, if not invariably, take different approaches, apply different tools, and make 
different logical connections in view of the resources (e.g., money, tools, and 
information) they possess, different approaches may prove to have independent social 
value. 76 
Regardless of whether a centralized or diverse approach to innovation is best 
suited to provide efficient innovation, the use of exclusive property rights raises the 
specter of monopoly. Where a patent does confer a monopoly or near monopoly on 
its holder, it has the potential to add costs to a system of sequential or cumulative 
innovation. 77 The lower output, higher demand, and higher price realized in a 
70. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. 
L. REV. 839, 839-40 (1990). 
71. Id. at 872. 
72. But see SCHUMPETER, supra note 57, at 87-106 (arguing, in effect, that the stick is "ever-present"). 
73. See KENNETH J. ARROW, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Innovation, in 
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 619-22 (National Bureau of Economic Reserve 
ed., 1962) (arguing that "the incentive to invent is less under monopolistic than under competitive 
conditions"). 
74. Merges & Nelson, supra note 70, at 873- 77. 
75. Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 263 
( 1994) (arguing that benefits of diversity flowing from a competitive approach to innovation may outweigh 
the waste of duplicative efforts; and to the extent there is waste, it is not the sort with which public policy 
should be concerned). 
76. Fostering Cumulative Innovation, supra note 56, at 825. 
77. One important way that monopolies may add costs to innovation is by the commonly known feature 
of dead weight loss. Under general principles of supply and demand, as the price of a good declines the 
amount of demand for the good will increase. A firm maximizes profits by selling at a point where marginal 
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monopoly situation works to raise the cost of access to patented subject matter. Where 
multiple rights must be acquired, as may typically be the case in situations of complex 
and/or sequential innovation, the cost of the acquisition of rights may quickly increase 
beyond the cost that would have been paid in a competitive environment. The more 
rights that need to be acquired, the greater the premium that must be paid to engage in 
innovation. As the premium increases, the more it eats into the profits expected to 
result from engaging in innovation. Hypothetically, there comes a point at which the 
costs involved may suppress altogether the economic motivations to pursue an 
innovation. 
2. Additional Innovation Suppressive Costs 
Inherent in the use of property rights are another set of innovation suppressive 
costs78-the transactional costs ofinformation 79 and negotiation. In general terms, to 
transact in property rights parties must form an understanding of the legal relationships 
between one another as well as an understanding of the subject matter-the thing-that 
is the nexus of the relationship between the parties. 80 In addition, the parties must form 
an accurate understanding of the respective value of the rights, avoiding exorbitant 
holdout rents and, where relevant, free riding. Inefficiencies in these tasks add costs 
to the transaction and make the movement of property rights from lower valued to 
higher valued uses less efficient. 
In an influential article, Michael Heller describes a tangible property scenario 
where transaction costs attending the bundling of various rights are sufficiently high 
that ordinary market mechanisms have difficulty aligning rights so that property is put 
to its best use. 81 By contrast to the catastrophic overuse that characterizes communal 
revenue, i.e., the amount a firm earns from the sale of an additional unit, equals its marginal cost, i.e., the 
cost incurred in producing the additional unit. Thus, where marginal revenue is greater than marginal cost, 
a firm should produce more output. Conversely, where the marginal cost is greater than the marginal 
revenue a firm has lost money by overproducing the good. 
In a competitive environment, the presence of multiple sellers fixes marginal revenue at the price 
set in the market. In the absence of competition or the availability of equivalent or substitute goods, 
however, marginal costs may remain the same, but the point at which marginal revenue equals marginal 
cost (and profits are therefore maximized) is at a level of output less than what would be produced in a 
competitive market. Consequently, a profit maximizing firm that has a monopoly or near monopoly will 
sell fewer goods at a higher price. The dead weight loss is seen through the loss of output. Those who 
would have purchased the additional goods at lower prices cannot do so and some profit that could have 
been realized by the monopolist is not realized. See generally DONALDS. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF 
PATENT LAW 57-62 (3d ed. 2004). 
78. See discussion supra note 55. 
79. For a lengthy theoretical discussion of information costs in intellectual property, see Clarisa Long, 
Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465 (2004). For a description of some rules 
the United States Patent System employs to reduce information costs during claim interpretation, see 
Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation and Information Costs, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
57 (2005). For discussion on how the Patent Office can remedy information cost problems, see Joseph 
Scott Miller, Enhancing Patent Disclosure for Faithful Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS&CLARK L. REV. 177 
(2005), and Petherbridge, supra note 67. 
80. Long, supra note 79, at 472-73. 
81. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to 
Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 622, 623 (I 998). 
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ownership in the tragedy of the commons, 82 a tragedy ofunderuse, a "tragedy of the 
anticommons," might arise when enough multiple owners have the right to exclude 
others from a scarce resource. 
More recent works have hypothesized that a growing number of property rights 
in the form of patents is causing an accretion of transaction costs that may be 
attenuating innovation in the life sciences. 83 In this view, legislative and university 
policies create an environment of highly fragmented rights, which in the life sciences 
combine with a practical requirement of complex sequential innovation to coalesce into 
a perfect storm of innovation destroying transaction costs. Thus, legislative policy 
choices given force by the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act84 and the Federal Courts 
Improvement Act of 1982 (creating the Federal Circuit) contribute to the tragedy by 
encouraging the formal propertization of publicly funded invention and discovery. 85 
Thus, for example, ifa large and diverse population of property owners through 
patents directed to nucleic acid sequence fragments each had the right to exclude others 
from the use of part of a gene for a receptor important in the study of a disease 
pathology and treatment, it might be very costly to gather all of the licenses necessary 
for one or a small number of entities to engage subsequent innovation. 86 To the extent 
that subsequent research and development, marketing approval, and manufacturing and 
sales is very expensive, pursuing subsequent innovation may be too risky for firms that 
cannot obtain all the necessary permissions. A risk enhanced by the knowledge that 
there is rarely, if ever, a guarantee that subsequent research and investment will 
produce a commercially marketable product. 
The cost of innovation in such an environment may be further enhanced by the 
strategic behavior of upstream entities. By encouraging patenting at this level, the 
thinking goes, innovation policy inserts large numbers of broad upstream rights far 
removed from widely demanded commercial products. 87 Because universities and 
82. See Garret Hardin. The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
83. See. e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 ( 1998); Arti K. Rai & Rebecca Eisenberg, Bayh-
Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (2003); Arti K. Rai & 
James Boyle, Synthetic Biology: Caught between Property Rights, the Public Domain, and the Commons, 
PLoS BIOLOGY, (forthcoming), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=94l 732 (follow "go to Document 
Download" hyperlink; then follow "Stanford Law School" hyperlink) (describing the potential for 
transaction cost problems in the developing field of synthetic biology). 
84. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 83, at 296 (arguing that legislative innovation policies neglected 
to take into account distinctions between upstream inventions directed to basic research or fundamental 
discoveries that enable future scientific investigation and downstream inventions, which lead more directly 
to commercial products). 
85. A result that, if true, is especially perverse considering the purpose of these policy initiatives was 
to promote the use of inventions and discoveries produced with public funding for the public good. See 
35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000) (stating that the purpose of the Bayh-Dole Act is "to promote the utilization of 
inventions arising from federally supported research or development"); Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 83, 
at 290 ("The sponsors of the legislation believed that grantee ownership of patent rights ... was necessary 
to motivate private investors to pick up where the government sponsors left off and transform new 
discoveries into commercial products."). 
86. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 83, at 699, for a very similar example. 
87. See Rai, supra note 7, at 135-36 (explaining that this has had a "dis-integrati[ng]" effect on 
innovation in the life sciences; where once pharmaceutical firms were vertically integrated houses of 
innovation, managing rights from early in the innovation process, the economic change wrought by 
legislation has dis-integrated this older innovation process). 
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smaller firms are less likely to produce therapeutic end products, they typically seek 
to appropriate the benefits of their rights by seeking some portion of the revenue 
expected if others successfully innovate from their upstream inventions and discoveries 
to downstream commercial products. This task is typically accomplished by licensing. 
In an atmosphere of uncertainty concerning the feasibility of any commercial 
therapeutic (or other widely demanded product) these licensing transactions can be 
very costly. 88 Thus, at least hypothetically, problems of information, strategic 
behavior, and the erroneous prediction of the value of downstream products can 
increase costs, thereby suppressing innovation and reducing its attendant social 
benefits. 89 
The following example(s) will help to illustrate how myriad rights could affect 
innovation. Suppose an investigator at University X molecularly clones a 
complimentary DNA ("cDNA") containing a portion of a gene encoding a receptor 
important in an intracellular signaling pathway that has been linked to aberrant cell 
growth, e.g., cancer. Assuming sufficient utility,90 novelty, and nonobviousness, the 
cDNA would be patentable under the principles announced in Parke-Davis. 91 Suppose 
a separate investigator at University Y isolates the genomic clone of the same, or a 
highly homologous, gene, which contains the coding sequences missing from the 
cDNA. In view of the law of written description and obviousness as applied to 
88. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 83, at 700 (making this point). This uncertainty can be exacerbated 
where negotiators have limited time, skills, and/or business acumen. See also Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, 
The Price of Progress: Are Universities Adding to the Cost?, 44 Hous. L. REV. (forthcoming) (at 44 of 
draft on file with author). ("It is understandably difficult for technology transfer offices to have resources 
to support the high-level knowledge of both law and business that is now necessary to responsibly 
administer the university's intellectual property obligations .... "). 
89. Both empirical and theoretical disputes exist concerning the impact of transaction costs on 
innovation in the life sciences. A recent report by the National Research Council finds that an increase in 
patenting activity generally has not been linked to a loss of social benefits. See NATIONAL RESEARCH 
COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY 29, 46-63 (Stephen 
A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin, & Mark B. Myers eds., The National Academies Press 2004) [hereinafter A 
PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 2 I ST CENTURY]. Other reports also suggest that in most cases patents may not 
be significantly impeding research and development in the life sciences. See John P. Walsh, Charlene Cho, 
& Wesley M. Cohen, View from the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309 SCIENCE, 2002, 2003 
(2005) ( concluding that the results of a survey of academic biomedical researchers offered "little empirical 
basis for claims that restricted access to IP is currently impeding biomedical research"); John P. Walsh, 
Ashish Arora, & Wesley M. Cohen, Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical 
Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285, 331-36 (Wesley M. Cohen and 
Stephen A. Merrill, eds., National Academies Press 2003) (finding, inter alia that upstream rights do not 
generally inhibit drug development). A theoretical basis for understanding these results is suggested by R. 
Polk Wagner in Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control, I 03 
COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1001-16 (2003), in which he describes an expanding information commons. The 
empirical data is not, however, all one-sided. See Eric G. Campbell et. al., Data Withholding in Academic 
Genetics: Data from a National Survey, 287 JAMA 473, 476-78 (2002) (reporting some level of data 
withholding in life sciences research). 
90. The utility requirement is still properly understood as very low and generally presents a low bar to 
patentability. See generally In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1369- 78 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating the standard 
for utility and applying it to a patent application directed to expressed sequence tags (ESTs) or gene 
fragments). 
91. See Parke-Davis &Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 102-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), affdinpart, 196 
F. 496,498 (2d Cir. 1912). 
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molecular technologies and products, this too is likely to be patentable. 92 Finally, 
imagine that an investigator at start-up Z purifies the polypeptide comprising the 
receptor. This also is patentable subject matter and could be independently patented 
by the start-up. 
At this point, a commercially viable therapy to treat cancer is far off. Already, 
however, each of these patentees respectively has the right to block all possible uses 
of each of the sequences of the cDNA, the genomic DNA, and the purified 
polypeptide. A pharmaceutical firm that wants to test its library of small molecule 
compounds might have to negotiate three licenses: two for access to the DNA 
necessary to synthesize the protein, and a third to work with the protein. In each case, 
the license must be negotiated in an environment of relatively poor information about 
whether there even exists a chemical or small molecule in their library that antagonizes 
or agonizes the receptor. And even if such a molecule is found, there is no guarantee 
that it would have the desired effect on cell growth. Moreover, if a molecule that 
suppresses aberrant cell growth is found, it would still have to pass through animal, and 
later human, testing to meet the marketing approval requirements of the FDA. 
In the event that a blockbuster is not identified by the foregoing approach, future 
research would need to be conducted. This would require permissions for each of the 
entities that would perform the research. These agreements, too, would be negotiated 
in an environment where little is known about the likelihood of success and the 
potential benefits. This research might discover additional molecules in the signaling 
pathway, which would themselves be patented. Other receptors that interact with the 
first receptor may be discovered, as may be genes and gene products that are activated 
when the receptor is agonized. Each gene and polypeptide could be patented in whole 
or in part by the various participants in the research. As with the earlier patents, each 
of these patentees has the right to block all possible uses of the patented subject matter. 
Still later research might involve the creation of cell lines or transgenic animals 
missing or expressing altered forms or the various components of the signaling 
pathway. Each line and animal, as well as the techniques for making them, is protected 
by the property rules of the patent system. Where the therapy ultimately consists of 
complicated recombinant vectors, e.g., gene therapy, rights in the DNA sequences 
comprising the coding, regulatory, and other elements of the vectors may have to be 
collected. Where the therapy is complex macromolecule, such as a biologic, the 
methods of expression, construction, and/or purification, as well as those of 
administration can all be expected to be subject to patent protection. 
III. A THEORY OF OPEN LIFE SCIENCE 
Relatively few would argue with the contention that there is value, both economic 
and moral, in addressing the healthcare needs of the economically disenfranchised 
groups discussed previously. 93 Most would probably also agree that intellectual 
property laws are not the sole cause of the lack of access, distribution, and allocation 
92. See, e.g., In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781 (1993); Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Arti K. 
Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 827, 831-41 (1999). 
93. See discussion supra Part I. 
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of healthcare resources to the groups described above. However, to the extent that the 
economics of the current framework of innovation is not producing drugs and therapies 
directed to important and devastating diseases-particularly if the lack of production 
flows from a disproportionately small investment in comparison to the impact of the 
diseases-it is worth considering other possible frameworks for innovation. 94 
Moreover, the significance of patents in the life sciences does not appear to be on 
the wane. Indeed, common sense dictates that patents will likely continue to increase 
in prominence as a tool for organizing research and development in the field. 
Acknowledging the significance of patents also means acknowledging that innovation 
suppressive costs are unavoidable, which in turn, presents the question whether these 
costs might be reduced. As a preliminary matter, one could ask whether the benefits 
of a property-based legal infrastructure outweigh the costs inherent in such an 
approach. This question has not been decisively answered, but at present it is probably 
enough to say that there seems to be little evidence that the general application of a 
property-based approach to innovation is incorrect as compared to a property-less 
approach. If the established proprietary framework is not broadly incompetent, then 
94. Others have confronted either this particular question or the more general question of whether 
innovation on the whole might be improved with legal change or private reorganization. See, e.g., Stephen 
M. Maurer et. al., Finding Cures for Tropical Diseases: Is Open Source an Answer, I PLoS MED. 183, 
183-85 (2004) ( discussing the application of open source); Y ochai Benkler, Commons-Based Strategies 
and the Problem of Patents, 305 SCIENCE 1110, 1110 (2004); Amy Kapczynski et. al.,Addressing Global 
Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1031, 1091-1108 (2005) (describing equitable access licensing); David W. Opderbeck, The Penguin's 
Genome, or Coase and Open Source Biotechnology, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 167, 224-26 (2004) (proposing 
a National Biotechnology Database to force transparency of the licensing market to lower transaction costs 
and move closer to a Coasian ideal); J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed 
Research Commons/or Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, 66 
LA w & CONTEMP. PROBS. 315, 427-30 (2003) (describing the parameters of a contractually reconstructed 
research data commons); see also, e.g., Alliance/or Cell Signaling, supra note 7, at 706; The Synaptic 
Leap, http://www.thesynapticleap.org/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2007) (providing an environment for online 
research communities to connect and enabling open source biomedical research); International HapMap 
Project, http://www.hapmap.org/datareleasepolicy.html.en (last visited Jan. 22, 2007) (providing a 
haplotype map of the human genome, this project seeks to make information produced by the project freely 
available by requiring that "users must agree not to reduce others' access to the data, and to share the data 
only with others who have made the same agreement."); Bi OS, http://www.bios.net/daisy/bios/about/3.html 
(last visited Jan. 22, 2007) (employing an open source approach to foster innovation on biotechnology); 
Bioinformatics.org, 2002 Organization Plan (2002), http://bioinformatics.org/about/plan-20020920.pdfat 
5-19 (providing an open access/source resource for bioinformatics); Open Bioinformatics Foundation, 
www.open-bio.org/wiki/main_page (last visited Feb. 4, 2007) (providing support for open source 
bioinformatics). An additional example is reflected in the Brief of Twenty-Four Intellectual Property Law 
Professors as Amicus Curiae, supporting KS R's petition for writ of certiorari in KSR International Co. v. 
Teleflex, Inc., No. 04-1350, (U.S. May 12, 2005) (arguing for a change in the standard for patentability). 
Legislative means have also been proposed. See, e.g., Genomic Research and Accessibility Act, H.R. 977, 
I 10th Cong. (2007) (directed to prohibiting the patentability of nucleotide sequences). Many of the 
suggestions and proposals in the cited references have merit, and it is not the plan of this Article to dissect 
and discuss them all. As is evident in later sections of the Article, to the extent the Article reflects a 
preference it is likely in the direction of private ordering because it permits particularized arrangements that 
offer a precision that is sometimes difficult to capture with legislative interference or other top-down legal 
change. 
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the application of a principle of reasonable precaution argues that any modifications 
or additions to the current innovation paradigm be tailored to not unreasonably disrupt 
the basic proprietary framework. At this level of resolution, the question becomes 
what, if anything, can be done to refine the current innovation infrastructure in a way 
that complements the current use of property rights, but also creates the possibility that 
certain types of innovation will be more likely to occur and makes more widespread 
access to innovation that does occur. 
One refinement might come from reconsidering the way in which property rights 
are deployed. Instead of conceptualizing property as, primarily, a tool of exclusion, 
property could sometimes be deployed as a tool of inclusion. As discussed below, the 
liberal access to rights that might follow can in some cases be expected to encourage 
innovation. 
A. Open Science 
At the outset, some explanation of the term "open science" is appropriate. As used 
here, it refers to a framework for innovation directed to providing liberal, low-cost 
access to intangible (patented) property for the purpose of the creation and accretion 
of new and useful information and materials that meaningfully advance the state of 
knowledge and skill in a relevant technological area. In general terms, open science 
is meant to reflect a socially sensible approach to innovation by recognizing that in 
some cases the grant of liberal rights to use certain property is a superior approach to 
innovation than an approach that vests an exclusive right in a single firm. As discussed 
in more detail below, the use of the term here is not meant to suggest that anyone and 
everyone should always have the right to use all relevant property in every situation. 
Rather, an open science approach is properly tailored based on a consideration of the 
facts and circumstances. 
As described, open science depends on relatively liberal, low-cost access to 
property rights. That being the case, as a preliminary matter it is important to consider 
the question whether such liberal, low-cost access is harmful to innovation. The 
general answer is almost certainly that it depends. Surely some innovation will happen 
in the absence of patents, so removing the possibility of a patent would at worst slow 
down the pace of innovation. Thus, the detriment would presumably be mostly 
concentrated on those who needed the advances sooner. However, the animating 
concern here is directing innovation to seemingly underserved markets. In cases where 
relatively little work is being done, we might conclude that the contemporary 
framework has not encouraged the desired level of productivity. Thus, liberalizing 
access, at a minimum, might be expected to be no worse than the current state of 
affairs. 
The next question to consider is whether liberalizing access could promote 
innovation. This answer, too, is almost certainly that it depends. Reducing the cost of 
access to rights could be expected to lower the cost of innovation-potentially 
encouraging innovators who might have been sitting on the sidelines due to concerns 
over the access to rights. Thus, alternative means of funding the work might become 
more feasible, e.g., not-for-profit pharmaceutical companies, government, or United 
Nations funded research might be performed on a contractual basis. Moreover, where 
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upstream rights are involved, potential returns might not be prohibitively diminished, 
especially where patents remained available for end products or therapies. 
Creating a framework of liberal access to property rights may have additional 
innovation-enhancing benefits in the life sciences. As described in more detail below, 
some benefits may flow from general features of innovation in the life sciences, while 
others may flow from the ability to achieve at least some innovative advances through 
the use of large, loosely organized peer research collaborations. 
There are several features ofinnovation in the life sciences, which suggest that an 
open science approach may sometimes be appropriate. First, innovation in the life 
sciences can be highly cumulative. Upstream inventions may feature prominently in 
dO\vnstream in.'lovation. In situations where considerable work remains to be done to 
connect a new discovery with a broadly useful product or therapeutic, it can make 
sense to provide liberal access to the use of the discovery. 95 Moreover, in cases 
involving upstream inventions that are of broad technological importance, rights 
attaching to such inventions could operate as powerful tools to organize downstream 
innovation. 96 
Second, innovation in the life sciences is characterized by significant platform 
susceptibility. There are a broad variety of platform technologies that are capable of 
serving as common research resources. Many of these platform technologies are 
capable of providing both a structural and functional context for research and for the 
production of a wide variety of important innovation outputs. Some examples include 
molecular systems, e.g., cloning vectors, molecular libraries, expression cloning 
systems, two-hybrid systems, and inducible expression systems. 97 Other examples 
include cell lines, which provide an irritable structural and functional environment for 
the reproduction and examination of any number of cellular processes and molecular 
interactions. Yet other examples include transgenic animals, which can be precisely 
tailored to express vel non a particular gene, to screen for genes important to particular 
functions, to serve as broadly applicable disease models, and/or to serve as bio-reactors 
for the production of important substances. The broad platform susceptibility of 
innovation in the life sciences suggests that there will be cases in which innovation can 
be improved by providing liberal, low-cost access to certain technologies. 
Third, many of these platforms easily evolve in the hands of ordinarily skilled ( or 
less) individuals to serve important research goals. For example, cloning vectors may 
play host to a wide variety of molecular clones. Expression cloning systems are 
generally customizable to probe for clones across a wide range of species, tissues, and 
states of cellular or organismal differentiation. Cell lines and transgenic animals can 
be modified using ordinary techniques of gene introduction, ablation, and/or cellular 
cloning 98 to express exogenous genes, ablate endogenous genes, introduce dominant 
95. This makes sense whether or not one adheres to the view that centralization is the superior form of 
organization. In some cases, it can make sense for a property owner to make liberal grants of the right to 
use a patent, and perhaps even to include others in ownership. 
96. The example of the receptor, discussed supra Part ll.B.2, provides at least one example. There are 
numerous other examples, and new possibilities are ever arising. 
97. See, e.g., Mutated steroid hormone receptors, methods for their use and molecular switch for gene 
therapy, U.S. Patent No. 5,935,934 (filed May 30, 1995). 
98. Notice of this common practice has reached even lay legal audiences. See Univ. of Rochester v. 
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negative mutations, and express chimeric molecules. 99 Inducible expression systems 
can be customized to express a massive array of genes, gene fragments, mutants, or 
chimeric genes in a number of cellular and animal environments. The same is true for 
transgenic animals, which can be customized to express vet non genes, mutations, and 
chimeric molecules, in a constitutive or tissue-specific fashion. The fact that platform 
technologies may be easily customized to serve a diverse array of research and 
innovation interests suggests the desirability of providing liberal, low-cost access. This 
may be particularly true where the range of uses is so broad that a rights holder may 
not be aware of the breadth of uses, or even interested in other uses for purposes 
beyond obtaining rents. 
A fourth feature of innovation in the life sciences that makes an open approach 
appealing is the historical presence of punctuating technologies. Some notable 
examples include the microscope, the advent of molecular cloning technologies in the 
1970s, the advent of Polymerase Chain Reaction in the 1980s, and the advent of 
knock-out and knock-in technologies in the 1990s. The broad application of these 
mostly discrete inventions has produced revolutionary advances in invention and 
innovation in the life sciences. It may be particularly important that punctuating 
technologies be made liberally available, because their application to a diverse set of 
problems can be expected to produce across the board advances in information and 
understanding. 
Finally, there are problems in the life sciences that are both very large and very 
complex. For example, a fundamental question in the life sciences is: What is the 
network of interactions involved in intracellular signaling? 100 It is likely an 
understatement of the complexity of this problem to analogize it to an attempt to 
understand the complete workings of the infrastructure ofNew York City by looking 
down at the city from the moon. The cost of resolving such complex and detailed 
relationships may be beyond the reasonable temporal capabilities of any single firm, 
even a large sophisticated pharmaceutical firm. Liberal sharing of access to 
information and materials may be a reasonable ( or perhaps even necessary) approach 
to resolving questions of such high complexity. 
B. To Open Science from Open Source 
The idea of open source, and particularly the idea of using property rights to 
leverage liberal access to materials and information that are typically legally protected 
G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting an example of the use of modified cell lines as 
a nontherapeutic platform for a screening system for therapeutic molecules), petition for reh 'gen bane 
denied, 375 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
99. The range of uses may be impossible to fully describe, but these general categories include many 
of the significant applications of these platforms. 
I 00. See Taussig et al., supra note 7. The description of the AfCS project is revealing. The Alliance for 
Cellular Signaling (http://www.afcs.org/) is a large-scale collaboration designed to answer global questions 
about signaling networks. According to the Nature article, the overall goal of the group is to understand 
the relationships between sets of inputs and outputs in signaling cells that vary both temporally and 
spatially. This will involve an identification of the proteins that comprise the signaling systems, as well as 
an assessment of time-dependent information and how it flows through the systems in both normal and 
pathological states. Id. at 703. 
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as "property," is most often discussed in the context of software and software 
innovation. 101 Of the merits proffered in support of open source approaches, two are 
particularly relevant to innovation in the life sciences: (I) the potential for reducing 
innovation suppressive costs, and (2) the potential for efficiency gains available 
because open source allows for a greater number ofinnovators working collaboratively 
in a relatively decentralized environment. 
In an eye-opening work, Y ochai Benkler suggests that commons-based peer 
production may be usefully deployed in not only software and distributed computing 
contexts, but perhaps in other production contexts as well. 102 What matters, according 
to Benkler, are the surrounding environmental conditions. The article distills 
environmental conditions that, if present, may support larger scale collaborative 
efforts. These conditions include: 103 (I) a pool of sufficiently skilled peer workers 
who could be motivated to contribute to a project in which many are unlikely to 
appropriate substantial monetary rewards; 104 (2) a project that can be sufficiently 
modularized 105 so that its parts are sufficiently independent and discrete as to be 
performable independently and flexibly by peer participants in accordance with their 
availability and motivation; (3) a project in which modules can be sufficiently 
granularized, 106 because, generally speaking, the smaller the cost of participation to 
individual peer contributors, the broader the pool of peer contributors can be; and ( 4) 
modules capable of being integrated at a relatively low cost. 107 Of particular 
importance here is the avoidance of spurious or incompetent contributions and the 
avoidance of unilateral appropriation of rights in the peer-produced subject matter. 
The array of approaches to invention and innovation in the life sciences can be 
quite diverse. In general terms, however, innovation in the life sciences differs in 
several important ways 108 from the software or distributive computing situations that 
largely animate the model in Benkler's piece. 109 These are discussed in more detail 
below, but include the following: first, innovation in the life sciences has at least some 
IO I. A number of articles and additional resources are available to the reader who would like more 
information concerning open source in the context of software and other copyright-grounded contexts. 
There are so many, that it is unreasonable to list them all. One beginning resource is the Free Software 
Foundation, which supports the General Public License (GPL) versions of the archetypical "copyleft" 
licenses. The Free Software Foundation, http://www.fsf.org, (last visited Feb. 5, 2007). Another resource 
that addresses access to copyrightable materials is Creative Commons. Creative Commons has a number 
of licenses, and its "Share Alike" licensing provisions appear to implement a "copyleft" approach to 
licensing. Creative Commons, http://creativecommons.org (last visited Feb. 5, 2007). 
I 02. For this seminal article on peer production, see Y ochai Benkler, Coase 's Penguin, or, Linux and 
The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 369 (2002). 
I 03. I have recast Benkler's argument just slightly. The last three conditions I describe independently, 
whereas Benkler presents these conditions collectively as significant to solving the problem of motivation. 
Id. at 378-79. 
I 04. Id. at 423-34. 
I 05. Id. at 435. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 436. 
I 08. But cf Opderbeck, supra note 94, at 181-200 (describing some physical and cultural barriers to the 
application of an open source peer production model in the life sciences). 
I 09. Recall that this discussion intentionally sets aside computer-driven approaches to innovation in the 
life sciences, particularly those that rely on software development. 
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high fixed costs including the cost of integration of materials; second, there may be a 
relatively smaller number of peer participants; third, some innovation tasks in the life 
sciences can exhibit problems of imperfect modularity and can sometimes be large 
granule; and finally, at least until recently, innovation in the life sciences was more 
subject to being appropriated by late comers than was innovation in the software 
field. 110 
I. Addressing Fixed Costs 
Innovation in the life sciences can be characterized as having generally higher 
physical costs than innovation in the software or distributed computing arenas. The 
consequence of higher physical costs are primarily to limit the distribution of resources 
available for research and development. As discussed in more detail below, this need 
not be fatal to the application of an open science approach because first, not all work 
has a high physical cost, and second, even where it may, the costs are frequently sunk 
costs making lower cost sharing, or "piggybacking" possible in many circumstances. 
Thus, while someone without access to a laboratory might not be able to perform some 
of the "hands-on" work involved in experimentation, those with access to a lab may 
readily, for example, set up in parallel to regular work additional sequencing or ligation 
reactions. Excess reagents may be used, or alternatively, reagents at or near their 
expiration date. Adding completed reactions to lanes on a gel that would otherwise 
have gone unused takes little in terms of extra resources. Indeed, it may be better 
viewed as an exercise in the conservation ofresources. In connection with the ligation 
reactions, it may be true that extra competent cells would have to be used, but these too 
expire in usefulness and the amounts used would ordinarily be minimal. There would 
be little additional "hands-on" work as these cloning steps could be carried on in 
parallel to the primary experiments that are the main focus of the researcher's day-to-
day work. So too, for the mini preparations or other techniques, e.g, PCR, 111 that might 
be used to identify the clones. 
Other examples of low (additional) physical cost work include setting up (in 
parallel or otherwise) additional amplification reactions for use in the unused wells of 
a PCR run. Primers are cheap, on the order of $20 or less for many PCR usable 
primers, 112 and can be easily shared between investigators. Moreover they can be used 
in connection with PCR to achieve a dazzling and broad array ofuseful work. Again, 
older or less trusted aliquots of polymerase enzyme may be available. In addition, if 
the conditions for amplification are different for the primary work and the open, 
collaborative work the runs for the latter experiments could be done overnight or at 
110. Ifthere has been a change, it is an increase in software patents and the apparent refutation ofa view 
held by some that software either was not or should not be patentable subject matter. Thus, software-related 
inventions are as appropriable by later improvers as patented inventions. 
111. PCR refers to Polymerase Chain Reaction, a technique for amplifying nucleic acid sequences. See 
Kary Mullis & F.A. Faloona, Specific Synthesis of DNA in Vitro Via a Polymerase-Catalyzed Chain 
Reaction, 155 METHODS ENZYMATIC 335 (1987); Saiki et al., Primer-Directed Enzymatic Amplification 
of DNA with a Thermostable DNA Polymerase, 239 Sci. 487 ( 1988). 
112. See, e.g., Invitrogen Custom DNA Oligo Pricing, http://www.invitrogen.com/content.cfm? 
pageid=88 (pricing oligos for general PCR purposes at less than$ 1.00/base) (last visited Jan. 22, 2007). 
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other times when the PCR machine would otherwise be idle. The resources used are, 
again, relatively small; some overhead for power consumption ( that is probably already 
fixed), and a minimum amount of wear and tear accounted for in many cases by the 
fact that most investigators or institutions have already sunk the cost of purchasing 
service contracts from the vendor of the machines. 
The above-mentioned techniques can be used to make constructs and libraries, 
perform other cloning experiments, load constructs into expression systems, and 
prepare vectors for introduction into cell lines and transgenic animals. Thus, these 
foundational tools of molecular biology can be employed at relatively low cost; a cost 
made lower in an environment of liberal, low-cost access to reagents. 
With more complex reagents, such as cell lines, costs may rise. In many cases, the 
cost of incubators and hoods, and perhaps even the cost of one or more well-trained 
technicians will be sunk costs ( e.g., in common resource areas and core labs). In some 
cases, extra plates of cell lines can be plated in parallel with regular work. Introducing 
recombinant constructs or applying available chemical or biological reagents can be 
accomplished at relatively little extra cost. In other cases, perhaps involving primary 
cells, or cell lines that are difficult to grow, the cost of obtaining and maintaining extra 
plates can be higher. Also, where experiments involve very costly reagents, or hard 
to obtain hormones, like RU-486, or powerful radioactive reagents, the cost of 
experiments may increase. 
Another example of complex reagents includes the broad array of possible 
transgenic animals. Perhaps surprisingly, the cost of the production of transgenic 
animals need not be prohibitively high, although their maintenance almost surely will 
be. Many of the techniques already described, for example, molecular cloning, 
sequencing, PCR, and cell culture, can be used to create and confirm the constructs 
used to make transgenic animals. Moreover, many institutions have already sunk the 
cost of the equipment rooms, injection apparatuses, and expertise, including dedicated 
core scientists and/or technicians, to produce transgenic animals on a regular assembly 
line basis. Thus, the opportunity for low-cost "piggybacking" exists in connection with 
transgenic animals. However, even where the animals are produced, the cost of 
maintaining the animals can be high. The animals need to be housed, fed, bred, and 
culled. And while this often takes place in dedicated animal facilities (so the infra-
structure costs are sunk), the cost to any individual investigator can be relatively high. 
In university labs in particular, some level of collateral experimentation can often 
exist comfortably within the confines of a primary investigator's budget. In other 
cases, grant budgets or funds provided by the institution contain some level of 
discretionary funding that could be used to support open science projects. In other 
cases, one or more institutions could agree to cooperate on an open, collaborative 
project and diffuse costs across several well-funded institutions. 
In an open science approach, the integration of results to further the progress of 
innovation will depend on at least two parameters. The first is the integration of 
information, and the second is the integration of materials. Depending on the meta-
level organization of the peer workers, the cost of integrating information may be 
reasonable. For example, sequence data, images of gels, reports in the form of tables, 
graphs, figures, and schematics, could be made available at a website dedicated to the 
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project. 113 The website could be a place where data is maintained. Peer workers could 
then check in to see the status of the project, contribute to the analysis of recently 
posted results, share ideas for future directions, pick up future "assignments," or 
organize loose collaborations to complete a next step. Indeed, as discussed below, the 
relatively tiigh skill level of potential peer volunteers, combined with relatively small 
incremental inputs, may make for fairly easy integration ofinformation. 114 In addition, 
such a web-based collaboration may evolve to have "leaders" who exercise more 
influence over the direction of the research than might be seen in a purely decentralized 
regime. This could be a positive development, in that this group could guard against 
spurious or erroneous contributions, refine future tasks for less knowledgeable 
contributors, and avoid some inefficiencies by limiting duplicative work. 
The cost of integrating materials may be higher, but in many cases not 
insurmountable. For example, in some cases, it may be enough for a peer collaborator 
to know the sequence information. The cost of having oligomeric primers or other 
length sequences synthesized may be sufficiently trivial that it can be absorbed by a 
peer collaborator. But even where it is not, the physical necessities of the transfer of 
genetic information are very small. DNA can be transferred on a piece of paper, which 
means that theoretically, it can be transferred nearly anywhere for the cost of a letter. 
Moreover, if DNA in that form is undesirable, it is trivial to precipitate significant 
quantities of DNA with a salt. Again, the act of transferring these materials take 
nothing more than sending a letter or small package; a cost easily borne by a motivated 
collaborator. Transferring other sorts of reagents can be more difficult, but only in 
extreme cases should the problem be cost prohibitive. For example, investigators 
regularly attend meetings. It would not take too much effort to bring along a cooler 
with a frozen aliquot of a cell line, or a breeding pair of animals. 115 Another way to 
efficiently transfer material is to make a deposit of, e.g., cells or clone-containing 
bacteria, at the American Type Culture Collection. 116 In the case of transgenic mice 
at least some could be deposited at The Jackson Laboratory. 117 
113. Sequence data is already often made available through websites maintained by the National 
Institutes of Health. 
114. Note that this statement is not absolute. There may of course be difficulty on the fringes, where 
the use of a particular reagent or the reproducibility of a particular experiment is particularly "hands-
sensitive." This refers to a phenomenon sometimes observed on the ground in the life sciences in which 
a particular experiment or reagent appears to be capable of being reliably used by only a small number of 
individuals. Usually, this phenomenon is temporary and due to a poorly understood sensitivity parameter 
in the technique that is discovered and corrected over time. 
115. Naturally, there are logistical considerations, including laws regulating the transfer of certain 
materials, which in some cases would have to be taken into account. 
116. The American Type Culture Collection ("A TCC") stores and distributes biological materials such 
as cell lines, bacteria, animal and plant viruses, and antisera. ATCC Mission, http://www.atcc.org/About/ 
AboutATCC.cfm (last visited Jan. 22, 2007). ATCC, a global nonprofit bioresource center, provides 
"biological products, technical services and educational programs to private industry, government and 
academic organizations around the world." Id. Its stated mission is ''to acquire, authenticate, preserve, 
develop and distribute biological materials, information, technology, intellectual property and standards for 
the advancement, validation and application of scientific knowledge." Id. 
117. The Jackson Laboratory, located in Bar Harbor, Maine, is a non-profit biomedical research center 
renowned for its collections of mutant and transgenic mice. See Facts About the Jackson Laboratory, a Non-
Profit Institution, http://www.jax.org/about/jax_facts.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2007). 
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Yet another way of integrating materials (and information) in an open science 
environment is to establish cooperative projects in geographic areas with high 
concentrations of peer workers. A prototypical example could be the Texas Medical 
Center ("TMC"). At a minimum, 118 the TMC boasts three nationally renowned 
institutions that are home to very large multi-department research and development 
communities, Baylor College ofMedicine, 119 the M.D. Anderson Cancer Center, 120 and 
the University of Texas Medical School. 121 Together, the three institutions support ( or 
are supported by) many hundreds of primary investigators, many hundreds of post-
doctoral fellows, hundreds of graduate students, hundreds of medical students, and 
large numbers of technicians. Each institution is literally a stone's-throw or two from 
the other. 122 The transfer ofall sorts of materials in this environment would take quite 
literally no more than fifteen minutes-the amount of time it takes to cross the street. 
Informal meetings, follow up questions on the nuances of techniques, or additional 
information on results is easily conveyed over lunch, or at workshops directed to a 
particular project. 123 Moreover, these three major institutions are complemented by 
two other institutions that do significant amounts of biological and biomedical 
research. Texas A&M University 124 with its research resources is approximately an 
hour-and-a-half away by car, 125 and the University of Texas Medical Branch at 
Galveston 126 is an hour's drive. It would be a small task for a motivated peer worker 
to drive to or from College Station or Galveston to obtain materials useful to the 
collaborative project. Thus, to the extent the integration ofresearch tools and materials 
would be difficult when open collaborations take place over large distances, they might 
118. This conservative view ignores all of the research talent at the several hospitals in the medical 
center, such as Texas Children's Hospital. 
119. See About Baylor College ofMedicine, http://www.bcm.edu/about/ (noting that in 2007, BCM was 
ranked first in the country for research expenditures in biological science by the National Science 
Foundation and thirteenth in National Institutes of Health funding) (last visited Jan. 22, 2007). 
120. The M. D. Anderson Cancer Center is one of the nation's top two cancer centers, and has a faculty 
of over 1,200 who have attained the degree of either M.D. or Ph.D. The University of Texas M. D. 
Anderson Cancer Center Profile, http://www.mdanderson.org/ About_ MDNWho _We_ Are/display.cfin?id 
=29E3FCE1-2828-l lD5-8 I l 1005088603Al4&method=displayFull. 
121. See University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston Research Expenditures by Unit I 995-
2004, http://www.uth.tmc.edu/factbook/2005/research/resunit.htm (reporting research expenditures in 
excess of $148 million in 2004) (last visited Jan. 22, 2007); University of Texas Health Science Center at 
Houston NIH Awards by Unit 1995-2004, http://www.uth.tmc.edu/factbook/2005/research/nih.htm 
(reporting over $70 million in NIH awards in 2004) (last visited Jan. 22, 2007). 
122. One throw from Baylor College of Medicine to each of the others. To get from the University of 
Texas Medical School to the M.D. Anderson Cancer Center, one probably needs two throws. To the extent 
it would take more, it is because of intervening structures, not distance. 
123. This would provide a nice complement to web-based integration of information by creating 
additional channels to sharpen the information generally made available on the site. 
124. See Texas A & M University Departments, http://www.tamu.edu/home/academics/departments 
.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2007). 
125. See http://www.tamu.edu/ (College Station, Texas). 
126. See UTMB Facts and Figures, http://www.utmb.edu/ia/facts.asp (reporting that "UTMB is a major 
academic health center dedicated to health science education, patient care, research, and community 
service") (last visited Jan. 22, 2007). 
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be better organized when connected to geographic areas that contain a larger pool of 
potential peer workers. 127 
Finally, while this article largely eschews computational aspects ofresearch and 
innovation in the life sciences, it is worth noting that as computational biology begins 
to make more significant contributions, at least that aspect of research and 
development may begin to take on the more traditional attributes of the peer production 
environment described by Benkler. 
2. Peer Worker Potential 
Another way in which innovation in the life sciences may differ from the 
production of new software and a distributed computation model is that the pool of 
peer workers may be smaller. 128 This may be compensated for by at least three aspects 
of research and innovation in the life sciences, which set it apart from some other forms 
of innovation. First, the pool of peer workers in the life sciences is characterized by 
a high level of skill; both technical skill and breadth of knowledge. Nearly all of the 
peer workers will have college degrees, and many will either have or be working 
towards degrees as advanced as an M.D. or even a Ph.D. Many of these workers will 
keep up with current cutting edge advances in the life sciences as a function of their 
day jobs-being biomedical researchers. Thus, the knowledge and skill characteristics 
of this peer group may result in better auto-organization and better quality 
contributions. 
Second, the pool of peer workers can be characterized as relatively stable. As 
suggested above, these peer workers will not usually be hobbyists, rather, a description 
of their "day job" includes constantly working toward being a smart contributor to life 
sciences projects. Thus, the same skills they are paid to hone are the skills they can 
bring to an open science collaboration. The stability provided by the income they 
receive for being life sciences researchers will allow them to be long-term contributors 
in an open science project. As their time with the project increases, the intellectual 
memory and infrastructure they provide can enhance the quality of the work done in 
pursuit of the project's goals. 
A third reason to believe that a smaller pool 129 of more highly skilled peer 
producers can operate in a life sciences theater is that this group may be especially 
motivated to work on the project. In many cases, these individuals are life sciences 
researchers because they view the work as being of high social and moral significance. 
The norms of the field tend to include a belief that participants have committed 
themselves to lower paying jobs in order to pursue what they view as socially and 
127. While the Texas Medical Center presents perhaps the ideal geographic arrangement in the U.S., 
there may be other geographic locations where open projects could be based. For example, the San 
Francisco area of California is home to several significant biomedical research institutions, as is the Boston 
area of eastern Massachusetts. Other possible areas include New York City or Washington, D.C./Bethesda, 
Maryland. 
128. See Benkler, supra note 94, at 1110-11. 
129. That the pool of peer workers on a life sciences project will be smaller than the pool of peer workers 
participating in software or distributed computing contexts is an assumption, not a known (to the author) 
fact. It may be that relatively large collaborations to solve important scientific and medical problems bring 
together largernumbers of collaborators than at least some traditional (computational) open source projects. 
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morally important work. To the extent these norms control, 130 they enhance stability 
in participation, might provide for a net average greater contribution per peer worker, 
and in any event may provide for less fickle peer workers than in other areas of 
research. 131 
3. Issues of Modularity and Granularity 
Some innovation tasks in the life sciences can exhibit problems of imperfect 
modularity and can sometimes be of large granule size. 132 While there is an element 
of modularity in many innovation projects in the life sciences, heterogeneity exists. 
Sometimes, certain tasks may need to be completed before later tasks, however, 
modularizable, can be completed. Described most generally, a ,vide variety of 
modules are capable of being worked on by any number of peer workers, but in some 
cases, "earlier" modules must be completed before work can commence on "later" 
modules. 133 
Returning to our earlier examples, while any number of peer workers can 
independently labor on the task of building an expression vector containing the gene 
of interest, at least one expression vector must be completed before it can be 
introduced to a cell line or an animal. While any number of peer workers could 
conceivably then work on creating a transgenic animal, the animal must be successfully 
produced and bred before it can be made widely available as, for example, a disease 
model. Once the disease model is widely distributed, it can be used by a large number 
of peer workers to test a range of chemical and biological therapies. Thus, in terms of 
the production ofinnovation, the temporal relevance of some tasks, i.e., that they must 
be completed before other tasks, can impact modularity. Naturally, this need not be 
fatal to an open science innovation model as the creation of a molecular library, or an 
expression vector, or a transgenic animal may constitute significant advances in and 
of themselves. Instead, different states of modularity can be taken into account when 
130. But cf Opderbeck, supra note 94, at 186-200. 
131. This is not to say that there is no social conscience in other areas of technology and innovation. 
Of course there is. However, the traditional norms of life sciences research actually emphasize the social 
good of the work as a reason for participation and (whether factually true or not) as justifying less monetary 
remuneration in general. 
132. Modularity refers to the divisibility of the tasks of a project, and the extent to which they can be 
performed independently and asynchronously. See Benkler, supra note 102, at 379. Granularity refers to 
the size of the modules and how well the size of the modules corresponds to the motivations and capabilities 
of the peer workers. Id. 
I 33. I reiterate the qualification that modularity here is a matter of degree. A range of states of 
modularity can exist in life sciences innovation. One criterion to determining the degree of modularity is 
the extent to which there are multiple ways of reaching the ultimate advance. In cases where there are a 
number of independent approaches to getting to the same innovative output, there may be fewer 
bottlenecks; the result being that more of the larger problem can be worked on asynchronously. Thus, the 
model described in the text has a sequential aspect that limits modularity somewhat depending on how one 
defines the innovation output. However, other approaches, for example, rational drug design or synthetic 
biology, may, at some point in the course ofinnovation, operate to improve the modularity of work involved 
in the innovation by allowing different peer workers to work on different aspects of the problem, aspects 
less accessible in the absence of a wholly different technical approach or model system. 
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deciding whether an open science approach is likely to be a good idea, and if it is how 
to tailor the approach to be most efficient. 
The size of granules in life sciences innovation is varied. 134 Sequencing a gene, 
cloning, setting up a PCR reaction, writing a paragraph of analysis of a figure, and 
designing a set of primers are all fairly small-grain pieces of work. Sequence database 
searches, translating data into web-publishable figures or graphs, scanning figures, and 
performing some immunofluorescence or immunohistochemistry are also fairly small-
grain pieces of work for those with access and the relevant skill set. On the other hand, 
the work of organizing and supervising an animal or clinical trial may be of much 
larger granule size. In the life sciences, a rough rule of thumb might be stated: tasks 
involving higher physical costs (especially where piggybacking is not possible) or 
significant regulatory supervision are likely to have the characteristic oflarger granule 
size. Finer granule sized tasks are characterized by lower physical costs because they 
are inexpensive to begin with, because cheap "piggybacking" on existing infrastructure 
is possible, or because such tasks are not subject to significant formal regulation. 
4. Subsequent (Mis)appropriation 
Taken together, the variety of possibilities revealed by the considerations of 
physical cost, peer worker qualities, and details of modularity/granularity suggest that 
any decision to use vel non an open science approach should depend on the facts and 
circumstances. Up to this point, however, the discussion has proceeded on the 
theoretical possibilities, and largely ignored the impact of the legal framework used in 
connection with innovation in the life sciences. As noted earlier, 135 that legal 
framework is one of property rights. And it is property rights that present both 
problem and promise for any particular implementation of an open science approach. 
On the one hand, the right to exclude conferred by the legal rules allows later comers 
to appropriate investment made and innovation produced by others. 136 This may have 
the effect of discouraging volunteer innovation and participation in an open science 
project. 137 On the other hand, the legal rules create rights that have the potential of 
creating an innovative momentum that could thwart unreasonable rent-seeking by 
latecomers. 
IV. TOWARD A PATENT-BASED OPEN SCIENCE FRAMEWORK 
Part II presented a framework of innovation in which private, commercially 
directed science stands to a significant extent on the shoulders of publicly funded basic 
research performed by universities and research-oriented medical schools, and to some 
extent by the federal government in the embodiment of, inter alia, the National 
134. According to Benkler, varied granule size should not be generally fatal to peer production. Benkler, 
supra note 102, at 379. 
135. See discussion supra Part 11.B (discussing the legal infrastructure of innovation). 
136. See discussion of blocking patents contained in supra Part 11.B. To the extent that innovation in 
the life sciences is highly punctuated and reflects the broad application ofimportant platform technologies, 
this problem could be particularly acute. See discussion supra Part III.A ( discussing punctuated nature of 
innovation and platform technologies). 
137. See Benkler, supra note 102, at 379. 
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Institutes of Health. This framework prominently features the use of property rights 
as a means of integrating public and private scientific research, and as a means of 
encouraging the production of new and useful information and materials. As Part II 
concludes, the ubiquitous use of property rights, while likely helpful, logically has an 
impact on the path and progress of innovation. 
In keeping with the animating concern of this Article, namely, whether, and ifso, 
how, innovation might be directed to seemingly underserved markets in the context of 
a ubiquitous property rights-based framework, Part III explored whether research 
advances might be made in the life sciences in an "open science" framework. What 
was notable about the described open science framework was the attenuation of 
barriers of access to rights. The inunediate concern was whether research advances 
could still be made in the life sciences in situations where the right not to be excluded 
is liberally granted. Part III concluded that some research in the life sciences would 
continue, and perhaps even flourish, in an environment where liberal access was 
promoted. 
The conclusions reached in Parts II and III serve as important signposts when it 
comes to addressing the practical questions of: How might a patentee, particularly a 
university or research-oriented medical school that wants to encourage broad use of 
patented subject matter to promote certain types ofinnovation, do so? Is there a legal 
framework that could be used to support an open science approach to innovation? 
In view of Parts II and III, a legal framework useful for imposing open science 
should have certain features. First, it should be concerned with attenuating innovation 
suppressive costs, but remain alert to preserving as much as possible private incentives 
to innovate. In the prototypical cases of innovation directed to markets that are 
perceived as having low near-term commercial value, the concern that incentives to 
produce innovation will be attenuated in a practically significant way by promoting 
liberal access to rights and materials is probably not that significant. Nonetheless, the 
legal means used to impose liberal access to patented subject matter should seek to 
preserve as much as possible market incentives to produce innovation. 
Second, the legal framework should be concerned with promoting efficiency gains. 
In prototypical cases, where the market-based incentives to produce innovation seem 
already relatively low, reducing innovation suppressive costs may, in and of itself 
produce efficiency gains. However, as discussed above, very liberal access could also 
promote positive efficiency gains through the use oflarge, loosely organized collabora-
tions. 
Third, the legal framework used should ''understand its place" in an otherwise 
ubiquitous property rights-based framework. That is, it should complement, and to the 
extent it is an imperfect complement, it should at least "fit in." Thus, the legal 
framework should strive to limit unpredictable, and potentially innovation-harmful, 
externalities from its use. 138 
138. Indeed, this concern presents a potentially significant hurdle for a pure "patentleft" approach, i.e., 
leveraging patent rights to force the immediate and perpetual donation to the public of all innovation that 
derives from the use of a particular property. Specifically, the concern is that unpredictable externalities 
may ripple well beyond the boundaries of the subject matter over which the framework was initially 
imposed to the detriment of innovation in other subject matter. See Kapczynski et al., supra note 94 
(describing an elaborate cross-licensing arrangement as a prophylactic to this effect); Sara Boettinger & 
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Finally, the framework should be relatively easy to impose and operate. It should 
be relatively clear, predictable, and certain. And, while one size may not fit all, the 
legal framework should be tailored to deemphasize costly, complex, and sophisticated 
licensing agreements that may be difficult to develop, understand, and enforce broadly, 
in favor of a more "wait-and-see" approach to the appropriation of commercial value 
from innovation. 
As set forth in more detail below, the above-described features of an open science 
legal framework may be usefully imposed through a servitude. The use of a servitude 
draws on a "prospect" theory of innovation, but complements it with open access 
principles to alleviate the cost difficulties associated with having a single ( and perhaps 
particularly unskilled entity) exercising an unnecessary controlling influence on the 
methods and approaches to downstream innovation. 
While the form of private ordering described below may be surprising at first 
glance, it is based on familiar principles of property law. Its novelty comes from its 
combination of existing elements, which to the author's knowledge have yet to be 
tested in a real world context. Thus, what follows is necessarily a broad initial sketch 
that will need to be further evaluated and particularized before widespread imple-
mentation. 
A. Establishing a Patent Servitude 
By statute, patents are defined as having the attributes of personal property, 139 
albeit with a strong emphasis on the rights of exclusion 140 and alienation. 141 Thus, a 
"patent servitude" presumably falls into the formalistic category of personal property 
servitudes. Historically, recognized personal property servitudes seem to be relatively 
rare, 142 and an in-depth discussion concerning the general nature and enforceability of 
personal property servitudes is beyond the scope of this Article. 143 What is worth 
pointing out, however, is that while the property rights conferred by a patent may be 
different from some other forms of property, the rights that attend patents should, like 
other property rights, be crafted and justified by exogenous public policy concerns. 
Thus, the formalistic label is not decisively helpful in understanding whether a certain 
property right should be part of the bundle owned by any particular patentee. The 
answer to that question turns on economic realities, current economic sensibilities, and 
relevant policies. To the extent there has been some historical hostility to personal 
Dan Burk, Open Source Patenting, I J. INT'L BIOTECH. L. 221 (2004) (attenuating this concern in part by 
making improvements that fall outside the scope of the licensed patent subject to private appropriation 
while improvements falling within the claims retain their open access character). 
139. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000). 
140. See Cont'! Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424-25 (1908); Richard A. Epstein, 
The Structural Unity of Real and Intellectual Property, PROGRESS ON POINT, Oct. 2006, 
http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop I 3.24RAE _9 _26.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2007). 
141. See Epstein, supra note 140 (explaining that interference with the right to alienate is disruptive of 
the efficient allocation of intellectual property rights). 
142. However, they may be increasing in prominence. See Glen 0. Robinson, Personal Property 
Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 1449, 1455-58 (2004). 
143. However, for an interesting discussion, see id., Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable Servitudes on 
Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REV. 945, 945 (1928), and Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Music Goes Round and 
Round: Equitable Servitudes and Chattels, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1250 (1955-1956). 
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property servitudes, the complaints appear to have been grounded in policies against 
restraints on alienation or restraints on trade, and have been in the context of the resale 
of tangible goods (sometimes goods that were ostensibly covered by some form of 
intellectual property). As such, these historical objections may not bear contemporary 
scrutiny in the patent context. 144 
There are at least two ways to frame the question of whether a patent servitude is 
permissible. The first way proceeds from a sort of "property first" position: that 
strong property rights generally attach unless public policy requires otherwise. From 
that perspective, once any policy objections to patent servitudes are removed, 145 
making a restricted grant of patent rights should be generally permitted. The second 
way asks the question in a somewhat more positive fashion: whether on balance there 
is good reason to allow a patent owner to make a restricted grant of patent rights. 
As noted above, this Article is not an exegesis on the general nature and 
enforceability of personal property servitudes. Nor does it present a complete 
discussion on the nature and enforceability of equitable servitudes on patents. Thus, 
although this Article does not assume a formal "property first" position, it does assume 
that the public policies which support the property rights conferred by patent in the 
United States and abroad are sufficiently defensible to justify the several centuries-long 
history of recognizing what are surprisingly strong property rights. Accordingly, 
whether the law should recognize a restriction on the right to not be excluded, or a 
restriction in connection with the transfer of a patent turns on whether the restriction 
offends the policies that justify making property of patents or offends some other 
important public policy. Because restrictions should then stand or fall on their 
particulars, this question is better addressed after further consideration of the patent 
servitude. 
B. Patent Servitudes in Operation 
The purpose of the servitude is to create a common plan to advance research and 
development around the subject matter of a particular patent or patents. A servitude 
requires (1) the intentto bind successors to a restriction concerning property, (2) notice 
of the restriction, and (3) that the restriction either touch and concern, 146 or, depending 
on the view, that it not violate public policy. 147 
For patents, the important elements of intent and notice of the restriction will in 
many cases be fairly easily met. At the outset, it is worth noting that in many cases, the 
144. See Robinson, supra note 142, at 1480-1515 (arguing that the traditional hostility to use and resale 
restraints on personal property is misguided in both the common law and the intellectual property context 
because the reasons for limiting an owner's right to impose post-transfer restrictions on use and resale are 
more exceptional than commonly assumed); see also Robin Feldman, The Open Source Biotechnology 
Movement: Is It Patent Misuse?, 6 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 117, 167 (2004)(concluding that open source 
biotechnology licensing "should not constitute [patent] misuse"). But cf Boettinger & Burke, supra note 
138, at 225-31 (providing additional discussion of misuse in connection with biotechnology licensing 
strategies). 
145. See Robinson, supra note 142. 
146. See, e.g., Dukeminier & Krier, PROPERTY 748 (6th ed. 2006). 
14 7. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3. I (2000) ( discussing restatement servitude 
requirements). 
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acts which normally communicate notice in a tangible property case, e.g., writings 
between a grantor and a grantee or lessee, will often be sufficient to communicate 
notice in the case of patent servitudes. 
In addition, the Patent Office acts as a recording office for ownership interests in 
patents or patent applications. 148 Assignment of all or part of a right, title, or interest 
in a patent or application can be recorded, as may other documents affecting title. 149 
Thus, unless the director was to object, a patentee or prospective patentee may record 
at the patent office a "master deed" reflecting the restrictions placed on the patent. 
Accordingly, any party seeking a grant of rights from the patentee would naturally be 
expected to examine the ownership of the patent and should thereby have constructive 
notice of any restrictions. 
There are other ways in which notice of the restrictions could be conveyed. For 
example, the restrictions could be placed in the written description of the patent itself, 
or could be added to an issued patent by the use ofa terminal disclaimer. 150 Moreover, 
where a university commits a patent to an open science strategy, notice of the 
restriction on the patent and the common plan or scheme could be made well known 
by its advertisement in connection with the mission of the institution, on frequently 
visited websites, materials produced by the technology transfer office, or through news 
stories generated by the institution's public relations department. 151 In another form, 
notice could be provided by referencing the patent and its restrictions in scientific 
publications pertaining to the patent's subject matter, as well as on posters and slides 
for talks presented at relevant scientific conferences. Also, materials, information 
sheets, protocols, sequence deposits, and the like could all be marked with the patent 152 
and corresponding restrictions. 
Obviously, it remains a concern that someone who would use a patent might not 
realize that he or she is using it, and hence, may not learn of the restriction. Thus, this 
is a problem of understanding the full scope of the thing to which the restriction 
attaches. One suspects that there could be situations where this presents a problem. 
However, patent law has a number of doctrines that are directed to clarifying the 
boundaries of the property. Plus, in the case of scientific research in the life sciences, 
notice of the boundaries of the property will be readily apparent in at least some 
significant set of cases, e.g., nucleic acid and amino acid sequences and other chemical 
compositions. 
Accepting that in life sciences research a patent user is likely to recognize that it 
is using patented subject matter, there are several reasons why notice of a common plan 
for the development of patented subject matter might be implied for issued patents 
148. 35 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). 
149. 37 C.F.R. § 3.11 (2006). 
150. 37 C.F.R. § 1.321 (2006). It is worth noting thatthis is a bit ofa novel use ofa terminal disclaimer. 
Traditionally, a terminal disclaimer is used to disclaim a claim or to dedicate to the public some part of the 
term of a patent. Id. However, depending on the nature of the restriction, it may be properly characterized 
as dedicating to the public some part of the property rights conferred by a patent. Alternatively, to the 
extent that one purpose of terminal disclaimers is to provide notice of a change in the default rights 
associated with a patent, making the restriction public through this means appears to make sense. 
151. This would be easy enough to apply in the context of a major university, medical school, or center 
for research. See, e.g., supra notes 118-27 and accompanying text ( discussing the Texas Medical Center). 
152. See 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2000). 
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directly connected to a line ofresearch. First, the institutional players, like universities 
and firms, are a patent savvy group. Second, scientists and the firms that employ them 
are actively engaged in scouring publications to identify and incorporate advances that 
complement their own research goals. Given the documented increase in patenting in 
the life sciences, it should be nearly a default understanding in the industry that 
significant advances and discoveries are likely be patented. 153 The interconnectedness 
of the tools and information used with a particular line of research makes it unlikely 
that patents of any significance will be missed by the relevant parties. 154 Finally, even 
if it were possible for a firm to argue that it was unaware of a particular patent or a 
restriction on a patent, that lack of knowledge is easily remedied by a letter from 
general counsel. 
The next issue that must be approached concerns the nature of the servitude. 
Given the contractual qualities of servitudes, there are a wide variety of choices in both 
scope and term. In keeping with the premise that these covenants should be simple, 
having only a few different forms may be superior in terms of clarity and 
predictability. 155 I describe below some general approaches. 
Broadly speaking, the ideas for "open" restrictions described below vary in either 
term or scope. Variations in term range from limited to the life of the underlying 
patent, i.e., whatever remains of the patent term, to indefinite in duration. The use of 
a property owners association is also possible. In such cases, a vote of the requisite 
number of owners might be sufficient to terminate the servitude. Moreover, in any 
event, the term of a restriction may come to an end for any of the common law reasons 
for terminating a servitude, e.g., merger, release, abandonment, changed conditions, 
etc. 
Variations on scope deal with the degree of openness of the restriction. As 
described below, they range from promising not to exclude grantees or successors from 
the practice of the underlying patented subject matter to-along the lines of more 
153. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (setting out the increase in TIOs and university 
patenting). 
154. For example, if a major medical school were to make it publicly known that all of some number of 
its patents directed to aspects of skin development and differentiation were going to be made openly 
accessible, it is hard to imagine that any private research firms engaged in the study of skin cells would long 
remain ignorant of that information. 
155. While a contract approach might be thought of as generally providing more precision in the 
allocation of rights, a property-based framework can provide a clarity, a breadth of enforceability, and a 
predictability that can lack in contract. The advantages of these features ofa property-based approach may 
be particularly pronounced where the future is uncertain. For example, the long evolutionary period of the 
law of servitudes has through the selective pressures of the common law process (e.g., efficiency, morals, 
justice, precedent) refined a set of default parameters for the construct. The parameters include guidance 
concerning what circumstances are necessary and appropriate for a restriction on the use of property to be 
lifted. There are a number of ways in which servitudes can be terminated. A nonexclusive list includes: 
merger, release, abandonment, !aches, changed conditions, and relative hardship. Another way a servitude 
may be terminated is by a release or recission process implemented by a property owner or property owners 
association with the power to enforce the covenant. Many of the listed theories of termination allow for the 
constant reevaluation of the benefits and burdens of the servitude, and the termination of the servitude 
should the facts and circumstances so demand. Moreover, a restriction bound to and dependent on property 
expires with the property, tying the term of the servitude nicely to the legislatively determined optimal 
duration of the property. 
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traditional open source licensing-promising not to exclude grantees or successors 
from practicing the underlying patented subject matter plus all improvements 
developed through the use of the underlying patented subject matter. 
To illustrate the ideas further, it is useful to consider their depiction in some 
examples. In each of the following examples, the servitudes are created in connection 
with the transfer of rights in a patent or patents and the transfer could take the form of 
including a grantee in some significant right of ownership. Thus, the patentee might 
convey a joint undivided right to exclude. In another variation, the patentee-grantor 
may wish to convey the joint undivided right not to be excluded, including the power 
to let others into the right. 
In some cases, the patentee-grantor might want to be sure to either retain the right 
to exclude, or transfer it to a central entity, e.g., a property owners association. The 
reason for retaining the right to exclude or transferring it to a central entity is purely 
formal; the joinder doctrine of the patent law makes enforcement against infringers 
difficult where many own the right to exclude. 156 There will surely be cases where 
dispersing this right too will make sense. In each of the following examples, the 
"conveyed property" refers to that defined by the scope of the claims. 
Example l 
Not surviving the expiration of the conveyed property, the rights conveyed are subject 
to the restriction that no grantee or successor in interest will exclude any other grantee 
or successor in interest from the use of the conveyed property, or the making, using, 
or selling of any tangible embodiment substantially comprising the conveyed 
property. 
Example 2 
Not surviving the expiration of the conveyed property, the rights conveyed are subject 
to the restrictions that no grantee or successor in interest will exclude any other 
grantee or successor in interest from the use of the conveyed property and any 
improvements built thereon, or the making, using, or selling of any tangible 
embodiment of the conveyed or improved property. 
Example 3 
The rights conveyed are subject to the restriction that no grantee or successor in 
interest will at any time exclude any other grantee or successor in interest from the use 
of the conveyed property, or the making, using, or selling of any tangible embodiment 
substantially comprising the conveyed property. 
Example4 
The rights conveyed are subject to the restriction that no grantee or successor in 
interest will at any time exclude any other grantee or successor in interest from the use 
I 56. Thereafter, the right could be transferred. The potential problem with making the right to exclude 
commonly owned is that the patent laws have been construed to require the agreement of each owner of that 
right in order to enforce the patent in an infringement litigation. See Ethicon v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 
F.3d 1456, 1472 (Fed. Cir. I 998) (Newman, J., dissenting)(noting the court's holding that joint inventors 
own an undivided interest in a patent as tenants in common). 
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of the conveyed property and any improvements built thereon, or the making, using, 
or selling of any tangible embodiment of the conveyed or improved property. 
In Example 1, the restriction is temporally limited to the term of the patent. Thus, 
in the event that the restriction does not terminate for any of the default reasons during 
the life of the patent, it will still end when the patent ends. The consequence of this 
restriction is to create a period of open access that will be something less than twenty 
years. By extracting a promise from grantees that they will not exclude other grantees 
from practicing the claimed subject matter, the patentee has created liberal access not 
only to the claimed subject matter, but also to that class of improvements that directly 
employ the claimed subject matter. 157 
By way of illustration, assume that a researcher at university X clones a gene 
important in the life cycle of a species of worm responsible for lymphatic filariasis. 
The gene might, inter alia, be useful for expressing an antigen for a vaccine or for 
incorporation in a gene therapy vector. The restriction of Example 1, allows 
institutions and researchers who become grantees to use the gene (and assuming it is 
claimed the gene product) for a significant period of time, with a greatly reduced 
concern that their use will be enjoined and their disposition ofresources wasted. Thus, 
to the extent that a vaccine or a gene therapy flows through the gene or gene product, 
it may be pursued competitively by both public and private scientists (who become 
grantees). Moreover, where something of therapeutic value is generated before the 
restriction expires, if it uses the gene or gene product it can be manufactured and sold 
by any grantee during the life of the original patent. 
Importantly, however, assuming that advances-improvements-made during this 
period met the statutory requirements, they would remain patentable. This allows 
grantee improvers some expectation of appropriation. First, against those who are not 
grantees, 158 and after the restriction ends against all infringers. Thus, in Example 1, 
after the property that is the basis for the restriction ends the restriction too will end 
and improvement patents can be asserted against former grantees. 
Some would presumably question the judgment of allowing those who were at one 
time free to practice the patent, to later be held liable as infringers. There are a few 
reasons, however, why this need not be a great concern. First, if, during the period of 
the restriction, a competitor was competitive, it should have made advances and should 
have been able to obtain patents. Thus, a competitive grantee should have some 
leverage when dealing with other grantees after the restriction expires. Second, 
because there will be plenty of notice that the restriction will end, grantees should have 
ample time to organize their affairs through agreements, mergers, etc. Third, some 
grantees might be willing to make improvements available using the restriction; this 
keeps certain subject matter open. This could be a particularly competitive strategy 
for universities or peer collaborations that may be highly motivated to maintain access 
157. In other words, the grantees all have permissions--or licenses-to use this particular type of 
improvement. 
158. Note that it should be relatively easy to become a grantee, especially if the right to include others 
in ownership is liberally granted. While this will suppress appropriation during the grant, it is a convenient 
mechanism of autoenforcement. Those faced with a claim of infringement can probably get someone to 
include them in ownership and thereby avoid a suit for infringement. To be included in ownership, the 
competitor will become subject to the servitude. 
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to fundamental technologies. Finally, ifa grantee is so noncompetitive that they cannot 
obtain patents on improvements or make a technical or business contribution sufficient 
to maintain access to rights after the restriction expires, perhaps the right thing is for 
that firm to direct its resources toward other projects. 
The restriction in Example 2 builds on the restriction in Example 1 as follows: If 
the restricted property is ''used" in the practice of an improvement, it is made liberally 
accessible by the restriction in both Examples I and 2. If the restricted property is 
"used to get to" an improvement, but the improvement does not also employ the 
restricted subject matter in its operation then the improvement would be made open 
only by the restriction of Example 2. The restriction reflected in Example 2 is, like 
that of Example 1, limited in duration to the term of the patent. 
To illustrate, consider our earlier example with a slight specification. Assume also 
that the cloned and patented gene encoded a receptor. There might be agonists or 
antagonists for the receptor that could serve as a chemotherapeutic to suppress the 
growth of the parasite. Alternatively, study of the receptor might reveal a significant 
signaling pathway and molecules important to the growth and development of the 
parasite. Both sets of molecules present potentially useful targets for future research 
and various forms of treatment. 
Assuming the scope of the claims of the patent to the gene and gene product did 
not go beyond the molecules, rights in grantee improvements in the form of agonists, 
antagonists, or other signaling molecules, etc., would not be made liberally available 
by the restriction of Example 1. However, assuming that the claimed subject matter 
was used in experiments to discover and purify the agonists, etc., the restriction 
reflected in Example 2 would make rights in such improvements liberally available. 
Again, only for the term of the patent. Thus, once the patent expires, the points 
discussed in connection with Example 1 pertain here as well. 
Examples 3 and 4 reflect restrictions similar to those reflected in Examples 1 and 
2, respectively. The modification is one of term. The restrictions reflected in 
Examples 3 and 4 are facially unlimited in duration although they could always 
terminate by any of the default reasons for termination, or, if one were used, by the 
decision of a property owners association. What is particularly notable about the 
restriction reflected by Example 3 is that it provides for something of a perpetual 
"practicing the prior art defense" against grantees and successors--one that is not 
available in the background patent law. 159 While it would not include later ( after patent 
expiration) entrants, the advantage of earlier (restricted) access might give grantees a 
protective competitive advantage over later entrants, which could compensate for its 
lack of prophylactic effect. The restriction reflected in Example 4 is the most extreme 
presented in terms of forced access, but is of questionable forward depth depending on 
how "built thereon" is interpreted. 
As mentioned at the outset, to establish a servitude the restriction must, depending 
on the view, either touch and concern or not be illegal, unconstitutional, or violative 
of public policy. As discussed in more detail, there are reasons to think that the above-
described restrictions touch and concern either the patent, tangible embodiments of the 
159. See Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) ("There is no practicing the prior art defense."). 
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patented subject matter, or the business or R&D concerns of the grantees. In addition, 
the arguments that such servitudes might violate public policy may not be strong. 
There is some debate over whether the touch and concern requirement still exists 
in connection with servitudes, and if so, whether it applies to a servitude attached to 
chattel. Even assuming that the touch and concern requirement has breath, it may not 
be particularly problematic in connection with chattels. 160 While there may be 
conflicting formulations of the touch and concern requirement, it can generally be said 
that for a covenant to touch and concern it must affect the use of the property, or, as 
one case put it, "the promise must exercise direct influence on the occupation, use or 
enjoyment of the premises." 161 Thus, an imposed servitude that affects externalities 
created in connection with the use of a particular property is likely to touch and 
concern that property. This likely captures most servitudes that are not completely 
arbitrary and unreasonable. 162 
Here, the servitudes seem to clearly touch and concern either the patent or tangible 
embodiments of the patented subject matter. It is, after all, the patent and 
embodiments of the patented subject matter that must be used by any grantee in much 
the same way that a grantee of a parcel ofland would use or improve a parcel ofland 
in which she owns a life estate or term of years. Without a desire to use the patent, 
there is little point in becoming a grantee. 
Moreover, the servitudes discussed clearly touch and concern the business of 
being a university or other institution that is engaged in research and development. To 
the extent universities are in the business of doing research, they have a significant 
interest in maintaining access to cutting edge research and development. It is access 
that makes them competitive in terms of public grants, publications, reputation, hiring, 
and patenting. Goodwill flows from making and publicizing discoveries that promise 
to impact health and well-being. Moreover, there is goodwill to be gained by an 
institution taking proper steps or creating the perception that proper socially 
responsible steps have been taken to ensure that the public has reasonable access to the 
products of its publicly funded work. The goodwill that flows from being a successful 
research university might lead to tax advantages, favorable land deals from local 
authorities, committed employees, gifts from private donors for endowed chairs, new 
departments and buildings, or new equipment and infrastructure improvements. 
Under the Restatement's approach, one should consider whether a patent servitude 
is illegal, unconstitutional, or violative of public policy. 163 The first two objections set 
forth in the Restatement seem (at least generally) facially inapplicable. As noted 
previously, 164 there is no general prohibition on personal property servitudes. One 
commentator has concluded that even the application of patentleft open source 
licensing provisions would not be anticompetitive under the antitrust rule of reason or 
160. See Robinson, supra note 142, at 1455. 
161. See Caullett v. Stanley Stilwell & Sons, Inc., 170 A.2d 52 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961). 
I 62. There is no requirement that a servitude do a particularly good job of adjusting the capture of 
externalities. If it does a poor job, one might expect that the burden of the servitude would create a 
competitive disadvantage--a natural selection against whatever the restriction on use happened to be. 
163. See RESTATEMENT ( HIRD) PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3. I (2000) ( discussing servitude requirements). 
164. See supra note 144 (discussing the work of Feldman and Robinson). 
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be inconsistent with patent policy. 165 The more limited footprint of the servitudes 
described here seem to place them even more comfortably within the contemporary 
innovation framework. 
C. Additional Considerations 
In overview, the use of patent servitudes can be employed as a sort of "open-
prospect" approach to innovation. The prospector retains some control over the 
organization of the downstream work (i.e., by exercising some level of judgment over 
the grantees that would be allowed a "plot" in the subdivision). But because the 
"profit" the prospector seeks, while pecuniary, is not in the form of direct near-term 
licensing revenue, but rather in the form of (indirect) goodwill as a going concern, 
competitive advantage in hiring, and grant dollars, the prospector should have a pretty 
liberal view of who can be a grantee. Moreover, the prospector is happy to let much 
of the R&D happen through self-ordering among the grantees, thereby avoiding one 
of the more common criticisms of the prospect approach. 
The restricted co-ownership approach reflected by the use of a servitude has 
several positive features. One is that it is consistent with the policy of patent law that 
encourages the use ofpatents.1 66 Co-owners can generally make grants of rights, or 
license others to practice the subject matter of a patent. 167 These rights protect 
successors in interest from suits for infringement. 168 For a number of reasons, 169 
universities should be motivated to make restricted grants ofsome 170 of their patents. 
By granting the right to alienate, to the extent of the grantee's restricted property, 
universities can make it easier for others to become grantees or to at least get use 
permissions. The greater the number of grantees, the greater the supply of grants or 
permissions. The increase in supply could have a corresponding affect on the cost of 
access. Thus, when faced with litigation, the path of least resistance for a potential 
infringer may be to obtain a restricted grant or restricted license from a university or 
other grantee. 
Assuming liberal granting by universities and a corresponding reduction in the 
cost of access, a reduction of the innovation suppressive costs of monopoly and 
transaction could be realized. Also, to the extent that positive gains may be possible 
165. See also Feldman, supra note 144, at 167 (concluding that open source biotechnology licensing 
"should not constitute [patent] misuse"); cf Boettinger & Burk, supra note 13 8 (providing additional 
discussion of misuse in connection with biotechnology licensing strategies). 
166. See, e.g., Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (describing 
some of the aspects of co-ownership of a patent). Naturally this statement assumes some judgment on the 
part of the patentee that imposes the servitude. In particular, that it not be done in situations that will cause 
everyone to shun using the technology controlled by the patent. 
167. Id. at 1471-72. 
168. Id. 
I 69. See discussion supra at Part lll.B. 
170. Patents for which there is a high demand, and for which significant licensing revenue is available, 
might be better deployed in a traditional licensing or exclusive assignment fashion. Whether the restricted 
grants discussed here should be used ought to reflect some balancing of the revenue available through 
licensing, the nature of the subject matter, and the mission of the institution. For example, inventions 
directed to high profile, underserved markets might be better deployed through restricted grants. 
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through the application of peer production, 171 these too could be realized. Moreover, 
if the patented subject matter is important, e.g., a punctuating advance or subject matter 
the use of which is required for a particular stage of innovation, there may be a 
selective advantage to the servitude approach that could enhance compliance. 
Presumably some number of innovators who receive grants will invest in a path of 
innovation that relies on the rights granted. As more do so, the less sense it might 
make for any particular innovator to wait and litigate access. To do so might place the 
recalcitrant innovator at a selective disadvantage-particularly if innovation in the field 
is fast-paced. 172 
The temporal qualities of Covenants 1 and 2, and perhaps the reach of Covenant 
3 mitigate significantly the indefinite viral spread that follows from a traditional GPL-
like approach. 173 This can be viewed as a positive consequence because ifthere is no 
substantial advance on an open project in ten to twenty years, then perhaps the open 
approach to the project should be scrapped. Generally speaking, however, there is the 
expected trade off; the proposed innovation framework is not contemplated to be 
indefinite in duration or ever expanding in scope, so there will be times when rights 
need to be sorted out. 
For example, innovation could take longer than the term ofa patent. In that case, 
it is possible that innovators will have to reorganize in view of the property landscape 
when the restriction terminates. 174 Second, a patentable, commercializable therapeutic 
may have been developed during the period of the restriction. If so, when it ends some 
rights connected with the making of the therapeutic may become enforceable against 
the joint owners of the former property. Naturally, there would have to be negotiations 
-with their attendant costs. But as opposed to forcing negotiations in view of very 
poor information concerning profits, negotiations over rights in view of reasonably 
expected profits ( dividing up a pot of money) could be easier for sophisticated parties. 
The servitudes provide flexibility in termination that has been honed over 
centuries in the common law. Plus, as noted above, the irritable organism that is a 
property owners association can also abandon the restriction. If, for example, it 
becomes clear that an important therapeutic is at hand, the owners of the different 
"plots" will have a much better idea of the potential benefits involved. Because there 
would be more information available than before R&D began, it would be easier for 
sophisticated parties to divide up what would likely be more discrete benefits than to 
divide up, ante, what would likely be more speculative ones. This could permit a 
framework for collective appropriation, 175 which could help to enhance the productivity 
of the approach. Thus, if a POA were used, a strategic approach could "pay off'' a 
171. While possible, a grant need not be given to each peer worker. Grants could be given to firms or 
institutions whose relationships with employees are governed by employment contracts or state laws. 
172. A similar result should be expected if the open approach actually accelerates innovation. 
173. Covenant 4 is not well-tailored to avoid this effect. 
174. However, there is no guarantee that this must be so. For example, if the approach is working well, 
other technologies may be granted to owners in the subdivision on the same terms, thus keeping the open 
approach alive. 
175. See Benkler, supra note 102, at 443 (discussing collective appropriation in connection with peer 
production). Each joint owner would be bought out in a manner similar to a partition by sale. 
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sufficient percentage of members to secure a release. Alternatively, members' consent 
could be purchased based on the extent of their contribution, e.g., payments for access 
to later developed complementary rights, or other measures of contribution. 
An additional strength of the co-ownership regime is that it would generally 
protect a "right to practice." Because in many scenarios the servitude will not need to 
be terminated for a co-owner to practice an improvement, the right to practice retained 
by other grantees will encourage cooperation, and therefore valuable collective 
appropriation, or lead to competition in production that should move pricing closer to 
marginal cost. 
When the restrictions end before the patent term, because the grantees are all joint 
owners of the patent, they retain the rights of ownership, including the right to license 
others. This maintains some of the open character of the patent but eliminates the 
promise by other grantees that they will not enforce patents they have obtained on 
improvements. Although this might at first appear to be problematic, it need not be for 
reasons already discussed. Other technologies may be granted to owners in the 
subdivision on the same terms, thus keeping the open approach alive. Even where that 
does not happen there will be notice of termination, allowing competitive grantees to 
arrange their affairs. If after ten, fifteen, or twenty years, the open approach has not 
produced results, the ending of the servitude and a general reorganization might be 
desirable. 
Finally, and more broadly speaking, the servitudes are directed to a recognized 
public good: encouraging innovation. To the extent that there is little interest in 
licensing a patent, the objection to making restricted grants such as those described 
here should not be too great. How well they work will depend on how well they are 
created and applied to particular circumstances. If successful they could produce a 
social benefit, but if they fail, relatively little should be lost. No less one suspects, than 
what would be lost from ignorance or incompetent licensing. Neither of which seem 
protected against by law. And, like the roots of a tree moving toward water, the 
progress of innovation can be expected to continue along some path regardless. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
While the approach described by this Article could be implemented by any patent 
applicant or patentee, as a systematic approach it is expected to be most useful when 
applied by universities and research-oriented medical schools. Exclusive licensing 
provides one framework by which a university can realize a return on investment. But 
as a general matter, most universities and medical schools are not profiting from this 
approach. Moreover, at least some patent case law appears unfavorable to the prospect 
ofuniversities appropriating the value of their patents through licensing, 176 while other 
patent case law holds that universities are fair game in suits for patent infringement, no 
matter how attenuated their potential reward from the development of patented subject 
176. See, e.g., Univ. ofRochesterv. G.D. Searle and Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d 1559, 1562-64, 1566-69 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
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matter. 177 Finally, there appears to be a growing normative sentiment that patents are 
threatening basic science. 178 To the extent this state of affairs is a sign of things to 
come, universities may have to look elsewhere for a return on their investment in 
research and development. 
The approach described here presents a different, yet perhaps still useful, way for 
universities to get a return on their research and development investment. While 
patents that promise immediate royalty revenue can still be licensed, patents that do not 
can be deployed differently: To enhance the reputation of the institution; to encourage 
donors and hire and retain skilled employees; as a prophylactic against suits for 
infringement; to maintain access to substrates and reagents important for the 
institution's well being; to gain advantage in grant acquisition; and to gain advantage 
in the race that is innovation. Beyond return on investment, as a shepherd of so much 
public money the NIH and their grantees may bear some responsibility for the 
efficiency with which that money is spent and some social responsibility in ensuring 
that some of the benefits of that spending reach the public. 179 This or similar 
approaches could be helpful in fulfilling that responsibility. 
Universities are in an excellent position to implement this approach. The scope 
ofbasic research in which they engage is broad compared to private companies. Public 
researchers work in a comparatively wide array of model systems, employ a great 
diversity of approaches, and generate a great amount and diversity of discovery. They 
are also more likely to be first in time to important upstream discoveries. To the extent 
that pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies play a more dependent role, a 
patent-based open science approach may provide an evolutionary advantage in 
innovation; one that would therefore be guarded by the approach. 
By spreading appropriability to multiple firms, the described approach is properly 
concerned with ensuring that the incentive to innovate is not destroyed. Several of its 
features operate to permit some appropriability. As described elsewhere, 180 there are 
means, e.g., virtual or nonprofit pharmaceutical firms, NGOs, and contract research 
organizations 181 that can help to fund or perform research, or produce therapeutics. 
Moreover, administrative processes and the technical difficulties involved in 
reproducing some potential therapeutics 182 may give sufficient exclusivity to encourage 
their production by for-profit firms. 
Finally, in applying this approach, prudence should be the guide. It would be 
helpful to test this approach, so that empirical data might be generated on how well it 
works and what unexpected drawbacks, if any, are revealed. Accordingly, to learn 
177. See, e.g., Matley v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
178. See, e.g., Lori Andrews et al., When Patents Threaten Science, 341 SCIENCE 1395, 1396 (2006) 
(reflecting in the title this theme). 
179. A large amount of research funding at public institutions comes from taxpayers and is distributed 
by the NIH. In 2005, the NIH gave out over $22 billion in research dollars to "universities, medical schools 
and other research institutions." See http://www.nih.gov/about/NIHoverview.html. 
180. See Maurer et. al., supra note 94, at 183. 
181. See id. 
182. For example, biologics and complex macromolecules are difficult, if not impossible, to precisely 
reproduce. Moreover, it might be difficult to know whether one company has used another company's 
process in making a biologic, at least to the extent required to satisfy the Hatch-Waxman Act. See 21 
U.S.C. § 355 (2000) (providing for abbreviated new drug applications). 
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more about the patent-based open science approach described here, a study is 
advisable. One or more significant (but perhaps underworked) patents addressing 
innovation markets that are currently underserved should be made subject to a 
servitude applying the general principles described here. Subsequent interest in their 
use, and their actual use, could be monitored, measured, and reported upon 
periodically. 
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